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The paper applies a popular methodology of competing risks to the analysis of the
timing and interaction between the Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar transactions, quotes,
and cancellations in the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system. Consistently
with previous stock market studies, the bid-ask spread and market depth at the best
bid and ask quotes are found to be major determinants of limit order market dynamics
at ultra-high frequencies. Consistently with the microstructure approach to exchange
rate determination, the signed transaction activity appears to be the main factor be-
hind the limit order market dynamics at lower frequencies. Application of principal
component analysis to the covariate indices of competing risks identiﬁes ﬁve perva-
sive factors that capture 85% of the Reuters D2000-2 limit order book activity. The
multifactor competing risks model substantially improves the quality of short-term
probability forecasts for buyer- and seller initiated transactions, relative to popular
moving average-type forecasting rules.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The present paper is aimed to enhance our understanding of the short-run dynamic links be-
tween liquidity provision and order ﬂow in the order-driven segment of the foreign exchange
market. It studies dynamic interactions between quotes and transactions in the Reuters
D2000-2 foreign exchange electronic trading system on the one hand, and the publicly avail-
able proxies of liquidity such as market depth and size of the bid-ask spread on the other
hand. The competing risks structure of the model facilitates decomposition of the order ﬂow
into a number of distinct components identiﬁed by the direction and aggressiveness of trading
activity. Therefore, it is particularly well suited to study the relative strength and interac-
tion of passive and aggressive order ﬂow on the buy and sell side of the limit order book.
It is found that the limit and market order trading activity is very sensitive to the publicly
available information on the state of the limit order book. Another major vehicle behind the
dynamics of the price discovery process is the signed order ﬂow, deﬁn e di nt h i sp a p e ra st h e
diﬀerence between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated transactions.
The competing risks model developed in this paper can be viewed more generally as
a comprehensive partially disaggregated description of trading activity, where the level of
disaggregation is ultimately determined by the objectives of study and the data limitations.
This methodology can be used as an agnostic behavioral framework for learning about activ-
ity levels in ﬁnancial markets populated by multiple interacting agents with heterogeneous
information and diverse trading strategies. It will be shown how the model can generate
probability forecasts of short-term market dynamics that might facilitate the development
of short-term trading strategies by dealers and their sponsors.
The paper proceeds by the following plan. Section 2 gives the literature review on liquid-
ity and the order ﬂow. Section 3 describes a stylized model of trading activity in an ideal limit
order market reminiscent of the electronic limit order book studied in the empirical applica-
tion and outlines the objectives of empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the competing risks
model and shows how its structure can incorporate observable and unobservable limit order
book characteristics. Section 5 reports the estimates of covariate indices that capture a large
portion of cross-sectional and serial correlation between various types of trading activity in
the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book. Section 6 applies the principal component
analysis (PCA) to the covariate indices of competing risks estimated in the previous section
and identiﬁes ﬁve pervasive factors (principal components) that capture 85% of the observed
1activity in the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order market and have distinct characteris-
tics that facilitate their interpretation. Section 7 applies graphical diagnostics to evaluation
of goodness-of-ﬁt and out-of-sample forecasting power of the principal components. Section
8 concludes. The technical appendix describes semiparametric estimation procedure of the
competing risks model and gives the formulas for probability forecasts.
2 Literature Review
A large body of empirical and theoretical literature on market microstructure is motivated
by the central question of modern ﬁnance: How long does it take for information to be fully
incorporated into prices? According to the microstructure approach, private information in
ﬁnancial markets is ultimately transmitted via continuous interaction of quotes and transac-
tions. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the frequency and complexity of arrival patterns
for quotes and transactions, as well as the choice of the trading mode, should be among the
key ingredients of any transition mechanism to the eﬃcient price.
It has been long recognized in theoretical microstructure literature (Diamond and Ver-
recchia [11], Admati and Pﬂeiderer [1], [2], Easley and O’Hara [12], O’Hara [41], Chapter
6) that at least some non-trading and quote delays can be purposeful and informationally
motivated. For example, a Bayesian market maker in Easley and O’Hara [12] infers about
the presence of informed traders on the market from the intertrade durations, with shorter
durations signalling the informed trader activity. In applications, a purely statistical model
for duration process is almost always augmented by some proxy characterizing the amount of
private information on the market, such as the market bid-ask spread, trading volume, etc.
T h ec h o i c eo fs u c hp r o x yi sj u s t i ﬁed either theoretically by market microstructure models of
price determination or empirically by availability of appropriate data at high frequencies.
In early theoretical models, the choice of trading mode is usually restricted to market
orders that could be ﬁlled at the prices provided continuously by the market maker, or,
alternatively, to limit orders for a ﬁxed quantity that remained valid for a single time period
and expired automatically if the order was unﬁlled. This obvious simpliﬁcation was a price to
pay for analytical tractability and crisp empirical implications of the models. For example, in
static models of the automatic limit order book by Glosten [20] and Chakravarty and Holden
[8], the focus is on the optimal bidding strategies of limit order traders who are unwilling,
or unable, to use market orders. A more recent strand of dynamic trade execution models
(Parlour [44], Foucault [16]) emphasize the importance of the risk of non-execution and the
risk of being picked oﬀ by informed traders for the order placement strategies employed
by uninformed market participants. The ﬁrst analytical results on the non-trivial interplay
between the limit order price and the time-to-execution in complex dynamic environments
began to emerge only recently. One such example is the paper by Foucault, Kadan and
2Kandel [17], where the interactions between the trading decisions of patient and impatient
traders play central role in the determination of dynamic equilibrium quotes and the bid-ask
spread.
Even though the information processing lags, random delays, and occasional congestions
in communication networks can provide partial explanation for the high level of noise and
irregularity of intertrade and interquote durations, their persistence and high correlation
with economically relevant variables such as the bid-ask spread and price volatility warrant
the closer look at the duration processes. At least, it would be fair to say that discounting
intertrade durations as pure noise cannot be justiﬁed in many microstructure applications,
whereas the attempts to fully explain the duration dynamics by purely technical factors are
likely to tell only part of the story.
It should be clear from the above discussion that the heterogeneity of investors emerges as
one of the driving forces behind the nontrivial properties of duration dynamics. At the same
time it must be emphasized that the timing of transaction needs is not always synchronized
across traders, even in the absence of traders with superior information. Traders always
have a choice between the submission of a market order that will be ﬁlled immediately at
the best price available at the moment of submission, and the submission of a limit order
that can improve the execution price for the submitting counterparty at the cost of delay
and uncertainty of execution. As a result, the variations in traders’ demand for immediacy of
execution aﬀects simultaneously the bid-ask spread and the depth of the market, driving the
dynamics of the limit order book and the market liquidity. Investigation of the non-trivial
dynamic relationship between three dimensions of liquidity, such as immediacy (the ability
to trade a given quantity at a given cost), breadth ( t h ec o s to fd o i n gat r a d eo fag i v e ns i z e
quickly represented by the bid-ask spread), and depth (the size of trade that can be dealt
quickly at a given cost) then naturally becomes the central object of research.1
The complete theoretical analysis of market liquidity in a realistic general equilibrium
framework remains the major challenge for the market microstructure literature. The prob-
lem of solving and analyzing the multiple equilibria can be extremely complicated since
traders’ choices are not restricted to one parameter such as the price or quantity, but also
include the decisions between the limit and market orders, sell and buy orders, as well as
about the timing of order execution. Moreover, in real markets the traders can cancel and
resubmit strategically their orders at any moment of time. Since full analysis of such a dy-
namic game remains excessively complex and just impractical to implement, the theoretical
literature so far has been focusing on one or two dimensions of traders’ decision, holding all
other variables ﬁxed or making other simplifying assumptions about traders’ behavior.
In an attempt to better understand the decisions made by traders in the real world, many
researchers concentrated their eﬀorts on the search for stylized facts and empirical regularities
1See the discussion of diﬀerent aspects of liquidity in Chapter 19 of Harris [26].
3with regard to diﬀerent aspects of supply and demand for liquidity in the real markets. This
eﬀort was facilitated by broader availability of transaction and quote data at intradaily
frequencies. Since this search was originally restricted to the markets that make such data
readily available, most of empirical papers in this area focused on the stock markets across
the globe where systematic collection of data on quote and transaction activity was part
of the institutional design enforced by ﬁnancial regulators.2 Sometimes the data were also
collected by private enterprises and provided to researchers on proprietary basis. Examples
of stock market analyses include Biais, Hillion and Spatt [4], Handa and Schwartz [25], Harris
and Hasbrouck [27], Lo, MacKinlay and Zhang [37], Griﬃth et al. [23], and Holliﬁeld, Miller
and Sandås [31]. For example, Biais, Hillion and Spatt [4] found that market orders in the
Paris Bourse consume the major portion of liquidity available on the opposite side of the
bid-ask spread, which then reverts to its original level as the limit order traders place new
orders within the best bid and ask quotes. Even though most of transactions in the Paris
Bourse occur at the small values of spread, the authors observed high-frequency negative
autocorrelation between the quotes, as the spread showed a tendency to alternate between
small and large values.
All of these studies either avoid the analysis of cancellation events altogether, or make
very simplistic assumptions about traders’ cancellation policy for the existing limit orders.
The results of empirical studies taking this problem more seriously suggest that going beyond
the trivial assumption might be a challenge. For example, no systematic studies presently
available explain rigorously the empirical ﬁnding of Hasbrouck and Saar [29] who ﬁnd that
the majority of limit orders submitted on Island ECN that are cancelled, get cancelled within
the ﬁrst couple of seconds after submission. Needless to say, incorporating nontrivial order
cancellation strategies, even though crucial for understanding the dynamics of liquidity, is
likely to make the theoretical analysis far more complex, if not infeasible. At present the
most promising approach appears to be the accumulation of additional stylized facts about
alternative aspects of liquidity in ﬁnancial markets and interpretation of their properties and
interaction within an appropriate statistical framework.
3 The Anatomy of a Pure Limit Order Book
To motivate the modeling strategy and provide the background for the empirical results of
this paper, we give a stylized description of the automated limit order book. While technical
details and the peculiarities of actual limit order markets must always be accounted for
2It must be emphasized that empirical research of liquidity patterns reveals a surprising degree of similarity
across alternative market instruments, trading organizations, and locations. In particular, we believe that
implications of our research will be mostly valid for a broad range of markets organized as electronic limit
order books.
4in speciﬁc applications, our presentation here is deliberately simpliﬁed. Even though it has
been developed bearing in mind the application to the electronic segment of foreign exchange
market in section 5, in this informal review we pay special attention to the salient features
shared by all markets organized as pure electronic limit order books.
In the forthcoming development, the limit order is deﬁned as an instruction to sell (or
buy) a certain number of units of ﬁnancial asset at a certain price, which is called the limit
order price.W ed e ﬁne market order as an instruction to sell (or buy) a certain number of
units of ﬁnancial asset immediately at the best available market price. While market orders
always face full and immediate execution, the limit orders may face only partial execution,
or may not be ﬁlled at all, in which case the untraded portion of the limit order is placed
into one of the two queues (separate for sell and for buy limit orders) and kept in the queue
until the order is explicitly cancelled by the trader or hit by the arriving market or limit
order.
A bank dealer can enter a buy or sell limit order into the system at any moment of time,
indicating the limit order price and the quantity of foreign exchange (usually an integer
number, in millions of US dollars) that he wants to trade. After an attempt to match the
incoming order with outstanding orders submitted by other traders on the opposite side of
the limit order book, the new order is entered into the system. Additionally, traders have
an option to submit a buy or sell market order indicating the price and the quantity. In this
case, after an attempt to match the incoming market order with outstanding limit orders at
the price equal to the incoming market order, an unexecuted portion of the market order is
cancelled automatically and a conﬁrmation message to the trader is sent. The system allows
traders to monitor their limit orders that can be removed by a hit of a “Cancel” key at any
moment of time.
The market structure which consists of the two queues for buy and sell limit orders, along
with the speciﬁed trading protocol describing the priority of limit order execution is called the
limit order book. The queues of sell and buy limit orders can be interpreted as approximate
representations of excess supply and demand curves for the traded ﬁnancial asset (Figure
1). The priority of limit orders in the book depends on the details and the trading protocol
of the particular system. All orders are submitted anonymously as the identity of a foreign
exchange trader is considered a strictly conﬁdential information and never disclosed.
Only a handful of real ﬁnancial markets are organized as pure electronic limit order books,
such as the one described above. In practice virtually any real limit order market represents
a hybrid system, which would be hard to confront directly with the simple model presented
in this paper. For example, the trader submitting a market order in Reuters D2000-2 must
provide not only the quantity but also the price, which does not have to be (but usually is)
the best market price available on the buy or sell side of the market at the time of submission.
After the market order is submitted it is matched only with the limit orders submitted at
the prices equal to the arriving market order price. The unﬁlled portion of the market order
5is cancelled automatically. Unlike the market orders, aggressive limit orders submitted at
the prices that are diﬀerent from the current best price can obtain price improvement, as
the outstanding limit orders in the book submitted at the better prices receive priority in
execution. The traders demanding early execution may be willing to submit a market order
and sacriﬁce the diﬀerence between the best bid and ask quotes (the bid-ask spread), or
submit a limit order which gives them a chance of getting a better price at the expense
of execution uncertainty. The seller who is willing to receive a better execution price may
submit a limit order with a relatively high price and be prepared to wait longer and deal with
the risk of execution uncertainty in the event that the market price moves in the opposite
direction, and with the risk of being “picked oﬀ” in the event of a sudden increase in the
market price beyond the level considered reasonable by this limit order trader.
The dynamics of a limit order market are illustrated on a series of graphs (Figures 2—8).
Figure 2 provides graphical representation of the situation when a limit order trader submits
a bid to buy one million dollars at the price 1.7510 DEM per US dollar, which exceeds
by one tick3 the previous best market price 1.7509 DEM, but falls two ticks short of the
price that would guarantee immediate execution. Alternatively, the trader can submit a less
aggressive limit buy order at the current best market price (Figure 3). In such event the
arriving limit order receives a lower priority in comparison to the limit order that has been
previously submitted to the limit order book at the same price. In the ﬁrst case the traders
watching monitors of the trading screens notice immediately the increase in the best bid
market price, while in the second case they will only observe the increase in the quantity
available at the unchanged best bid market price. Whether and how this public information
arrival aﬀects the behavior of other traders remains one of the central issues in the empirical
and theoretical market microstructure literature.
The limit order buyer has yet another option. He can avoid revealing any information
to the market about his intentions and willingness to trade if he submits a subsidiary limit
order, which can be an order to buy at the price just below the current bid market price
(Figure 4) or two ticks (minimal increments) below the current bid market price (Figure
5). In both cases the best market prices and quantities available to sellers and buyers at
these prices remain unchanged. Therefore, the information on the screens is not aﬀected by
arrivals of subsidiary limit orders.
The last three diagrams provide illustrations of the eﬀects of a subsidiary limit order can-
cellation (Figure 6), a market order-initiated transaction followed by immediate cancellation
of the portion of order which cannot be matched at the best sell market price (Figure 7),
and a similar transaction initiated by an aggressive limit order buyer (Figure 8). Note the
diﬀerence between the eﬀect of market versus aggressive limit order arrival on the market
liquidity. While the market order buyer only consumes the liquidity available at the best
3One tick = 0.01 Prennig.
6market sell price of DEM 1.7512 per dollar, the limit order buyer also provides liquidity at
this price, once it becomes clear that the quantity available for sale at this price is insuﬃcient
to satisfy his demand for liquidity. Since the information content and the role played by ag-
gressive limit orders in liquidity provision can be diﬀerent from the role played by market
orders, it is important to diﬀerentiate between these two types of events as they might be
used by traders possessing distinct information or having diﬀerent beliefs and risk attitude.
In the liquid ﬁnancial markets such as the segment of foreign exchange market studied
in this work, interactions between the limit order arrivals, cancellations, and transactions,
similar to those described above, occur virtually every second. Figure 9 shows a representa-
tive small subsample, which was the result of such interaction in continuous time. The time
period on Figure 9 covers ten minutes of fairly active morning trading on Monday, October
6, 1997. The light solid curves show evolution of the best bid and ask prices available on the
market. The crosses and circles mark the times and price levels of buyer- and seller-initiated
transactions. The chart on Figure 9 illustrates the empirical fact that substantial fraction
of activity in the electronic segment of foreign exchange market is not accompanied by any
transactions, but rather represents the reaction of traders who submit and cancel subsidiary
limit orders in response to prior market events. The analysis of dynamic interaction of limit
order traders using the screen information on the limit order book will be the main object
of investigation in this paper.
3.1 Data
Empirical research on the limit order markets has long been hampered by the lack of detailed
order-level data. Until recently, most order-level data came from the stock exchanges orga-
nized as electronic limit order books. Examples are Biais, Hillion, and Spatt [4], Hamao and
Hasbrouck [24], Harris and Hasbrouck [27], Holliﬁeld, Miller, and Sandas [31], who investi-
gate empirical properties of limit order markets in Paris, Tokyo, New York, and Stockholm.
Even though there are now several electronic systems trading currencies, corporate and gov-
ernment bonds, and other ﬁnancial instruments, the information disclosure restrictions on
the providers of such systems in the foreign exchange markets usually make the detailed
order-level data unavailable for academic researchers.
The data set made available by Reuters and provided by the Financial Markets Group
at LSE covers the trading days from October 6 to October 10, 1997 and also contains a few
orders originating late on October 5. As mentioned in the introduction, the only similar
data previously available to academics is a short compilation of quotes from a seven-hour
videotape of the D2000-2 screen dated by June 16, 1993 (Goodhart et al. [22]). The data
contain information about 130,535 limit and market orders made on the bid or ask side of the
market. Each line of the ﬁle represents one limit or market order and contains exact entry
a n de x i tt i m e s ,p r i c ea n dq u a n t i t yo r d e r e d ,q u a n t i t yd e a l t ,a n di n f o r m a t i o no nw h e t h e rt h e
7order came on the bid or oﬀer side of the market. In addition there are a few other entries
on each line, most of them redundant, which are used to validate the information on the
reported order characteristics.
The data set does not include conﬁdential information on the identity of dealers submit-
ting orders and completing transactions. Another highly relevant piece of information which
is observed by individual subscribers on the D2000-2 screens but cannot be inferred from
the data set are the best bid and ask quotes and the quantities of foreign exchange available
at these prices to any of individual traders. At every point in time these best quotes and
quantities are based on the existence of mutual credit lines between any given subscriber
and her potential trade partners submitting limit orders at this time. Although the quotes
and quantities available to individual subscribers would coincide with the best quotes and
quantities of the market much of the time, on average the eﬀective bid-ask spreads encoun-
tered by individual traders are slightly larger than the market bid-ask spread. For the same
reason, the quantities available for trade to individual subscribers might be diﬀerent from
the quantities on the market at any given point in time.
3.2 Empirical Microstructure Approach
In its pure form, the microstructure approach to foreign exchange determination4 postulates
that the order ﬂow (broadly deﬁned as the sequence of buyer- and seller-initiated transac-
tions) is the only variable explaining the long-range dynamics of the foreign exchange. The
microstructure approach has found a solid support in the recent theoretical and empirical
literature uncovering the ability of the order ﬂow to explain a large share of movements
in the major ﬂoating exchange rates5. It is commonly assumed that the beliefs of market
participants formed on the basis of diﬀerential information ﬁnd their outlet in the form of
order ﬂow. The ability of order ﬂow to capture prevailing motives of buyers and sellers who
exploit private information on the future price dynamics is a well documented empirical fact.
Even though ﬁnancial price ﬂuctuations ultimately impound the traders’ interpretation of
private and public information about the fundamentals, one can take a stand that at the in-
traday frequencies the order ﬂow represents the dominant mechanism transforming traders’
beliefs into the dynamic patterns of buyer- and seller-initiated transactions. For a number
of reasons, given below, no attempt to model this mechanism explicitly will be made in this
paper.
First, the focus of this paper will be on the short-run dynamics of market activity.
Therefore, we ignore the dynamic eﬀects of past activity at the lags longer than 15 minutes.
The key order ﬂow-related variables driving the dynamics of notional hazard rates will be the
counts of buyer- and seller initiated trades in the ﬁve-second periods immediately preceding
4This approach was popularized by Lyons [38]; see also a brief review of policy implications in Lyons [39].
5See, for example, Evans and Lyons [15].
8the sub-epoch, and the similar counts from the earlier history. We deliberately bypass
macroeconomic fundamentals as there is remarkably little evidence that macroeconomic
variables have any consistent eﬀect at the ultra-short horizons which are the focus of this
study.6
Second, the price dependence emphasized in the literature on technical analysis of foreign
exchange markets will be restricted to the price bounces between the last three transactions
that occur prior to the beginning of the analyzed duration period. It is important to stress
that no ap r i o r iassumptions will be made about the valuation of foreign exchange. In our
opinion, the ultimate value of foreign exchange is impossible to deﬁne without the refer-
ence to the “eﬃcient price” and strong assumptions about its time series properties. In
the ﬁnancial markets literature it is often assumed that the “eﬃcient price” is a continuous
martingale driven by a Brownian motion with constant volatility.7 This assumption is very
intuitive and appears well justiﬁed when observation intervals are monthly, weekly, or even,
with some reservations, daily, but appears to be at odds with the main objective of market
microstructure literature which aims to study the process of price formation.8 It is especially
important to avoid making such a strong assumption at the high and ultra-high frequencies
when even the very notion of “eﬃcient price” becomes less transparent because of the price
discreteness, illiquidity, bid-ask bounce, asynchronous trading,9 and other eﬀects which are
at the center of market microstructure research agenda. The broadly recognized and ac-
cepted empirical fact that even the most sophisticated agents may have diﬀerential beliefs
makes virtually any ap r i o r iassumption about the underlying fundamental value diﬃcult to
defend. However, the agents’ information and beliefs, which are intrinsically unobservable,
cannot be structured without making additional identifying assumptions about the process
of information discovery.
In our agnostic approach, we focus attention on the hazard rates of alternative events and
formulate the model using only a handful of observable characteristics that can be inferred
from a subset of publicly available data. Thus, we postulate that the limit order book is the
only medium for the price dynamics. No matter what foreign exchange rates — bid, ask, or
the actual transaction prices — are considered, their dynamics are thought to be driven by
interaction of supply and demand of multiple agents with diﬀerential information, horizons,
beliefs, and trading strategies.
6The interest rate news announcements appear to be the only exception but even those take usually
several hours to be absorbed in the market price.
7In the modern literature, more realistic assumptions about dynamic properties of the volatility and the
drift term are usually made.
8Hasbrouck [28] discusses the role of the “eﬃcient price” assumption in the market microstructure liter-
ature.
9Chapter 3 in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay [7] summarizes the early econometric studies that made
attempts to resolve these problems.
9As the exact moments of information arrivals are unavailable from the data, and rarely
can be identiﬁed in practice, diﬃculties arise in determining a good proxy for information.
Trading volume has been by far the most frequently used proxy in the empirical studies of
stock returns. However, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson [35] in a comparative study of diﬀerent
information proxies demonstrate that trading volume has the same informational content
as the number of trades. Similarly, Marsh and Rock [40] show that the net order ﬂow
(the number of seller-initiated minus the number of buyer-initiated transactions) explains
as much of the price variation as does the signed volume of trade. Geman and Ané [19]
show that the moments of increments of the time deformation process that makes returns
on a stock market index normal closely match the moments of the number of trades for that
index per minute. All this and other evidence indicates that the signed number of trades
could be a better proxy for the information arrival than trading volume and may be an
important factor behind the market volatility, and its persistence. Moreover, the occurrence
and direction of trades are readily observable on Reuters D2000-2 trading screens, to the
extent that a trader can distinguish between the ﬂashes on the screen that accompany any
new transaction that occur in the system. In view of this positive evidence and to the extent
that other information proxies such as the number of quote changes, price changes, and so
on, used in the empirical literature produced mixed results, we take the general premise of
the order ﬂow approach to exchange rate determination (Lyons [38]) and accept the signed
number of trades as a primary vehicle behind the information arrival process.
In this paper we focus on the dynamic links and interaction between the order ﬂow
and various types of market activity. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the eﬀect of the following
publicly observable variables on the order submission and cancellation decision:
1. bid-ask spread, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the best ask and bid quotes available
on the market;
2. price improvements and deteriorations on the same side and on the opposite side of
the limit order book;
3. depth improvements and deteriorations on the same side and on the opposite side of
the limit order book;
4. dynamic links between the order ﬂow and various types of market activity;
5. trading intensity (trading volume);
6. order ﬂow, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated transactions;
7. the out-of-sample forecasting power of the order ﬂow and other variables associated
with limit order book trading.
10To keep this work focused on a relatively limited set of issues and avoid additional method-
ological and practical complications, we do not model seasonal eﬀects and clustering of orders
at the round numbers (multiples of ﬁve ticks, in the case of DEM/USD exchange rate). The
intraday seasonality is undoubtedly an important empirical feature of virtually any ﬁnan-
cial data. Even though, in principle, the mechanical introduction of time-of-the-day diurnal
eﬀects or a simple deterministic trend in the speciﬁcation of hazard rates may lead to a
slightly improved ﬁt of the model, this will involve additional methodological and practical
problems. A substantial part of the detected seasonality is likely to be spurious, since the
trading history covered by our data set includes only ﬁve full trading days. In turn, this may
lead to incorrect inferences about the eﬀects of other covariates, which are the main focus of
the present paper.
We also refrain from modeling explicitly the empirically relevant features of real trading
process such as random communication delays and failures, lack of mutual credit agreement
among counterparties, occasional violations of order priority, potential implications of the
complex architecture of communication networks, and so on. For most of this study we
do not distinguish between the screen information available to the market and the screen
information of individual traders that appears in a separate section of the Reuters D2000-
2 trading screen, or comes from alternative sources. Clearly, ignoring the peculiarities of
actual trading process may play a crucial role for the success or failure of model’s predictive
performance and for the quality of ﬁt between the simulated trading histories and the real
market data. However, we accept the lack of realistic representation of some aspects of actual
limit order trading as a price to pay for the relative simplicity, analytical tractability, and
methodological generality of the competing risks speciﬁc a t i o nd e v e l o p e di nt h i sp a p e r .
4S t a t i s t i c a l M o d e l
4.1 Competing Risks
The competing risks model belongs to the wide class of semi-Markov models with a ﬁnite
number of state variables z1, z2, ..., zk. The trading history is divided into a ﬁnite number of
intervals (“epochs”) with random durations t1, t2, ..., tN. In the beginning of every period
n =1 ,2,...,N, the market is assumed to be in a transient state zn =( z1n,z 2n,...,z kn)0 char-
acterizing by the current limit order book and the recent trading history. It is assumed that
any epoch can be terminated by occurrence of one (and only one) of the R distinct types of
event (“risks”). Each risk should be easily identiﬁed by an action of market participants who
can submit new orders or cancel outstanding limit orders. Occurrence of any event induces
a change in the limit order book, but only some of these changes are publicly observable.
In the competing risks framework, we postulate the existence of latent durations asso-
11ciated with R risks that are simultaneously and independently drawn, conditional on the
transient state z. Only the smallest of these R durations is observed while the remaining
durations are right-censored. The competing risks are characterized by transition intensities
hr(t|z), r =1 ,...,R, which are termed “cause speciﬁc”, or “notional” hazard functions, and
interpreted as the arrival rates of type r events given that the current state of the market is
z and no observable event occurred for t units of time.10
The model can be immersed in the framework of multivariate counting processes (An-
dersen et al. [3]) and estimated in continuous time (Appendix A).
4.2 Events
The choice of event types that has been discussed in the previous subsection is somewhat
arbitrary and depends on the questions to be answered, data limitations, and the prior
theoretical considerations about the data generating process. We specify R =4 6types of
buyer- and seller-initiated events and select S =1 4“observable” types of events that can be
identiﬁed on the trading screens by all market participants. Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions
and summary of sell-side events, which occurs on the ask side of the limit order book and
denoted by codes “A” and “AC” followed by numerical indices. Buy-side events, which
occur on the bid side of the book and denoted by codes “B” and “BC” followed by numerical
indices, can be deﬁned similarly.
T h et y p eo fe v e n ti nT a b l e1i sd e ﬁned as a combination of order type (market or limit
order), character of activity (submission or cancellation of limit order), and the distance
between the price P ∗ of the limit order and the prevailing best bid and ask quotes Pbid and
Pask prior to the event (column 2). The consequences for the best bid and ask prices and for
the liquidity of the limit order book (market depth) at these prices are indicated in columns
3 and 4 of Table 1. The events associated with arrivals of market and limit sell orders are
denoted by letter “A” (which means the activity occurs on the ask side of the limit order
book) followed by a numerical index corresponding to the sell order aggressiveness. Similarly,
the cancellations of sell limit orders are denoted by “AC” followed by a numerical index that
depends on the distance between the limit order price and the best market ask quote. The
events marked in the ﬁrst column of the table by single and double stars can be observed
by all market participants. The events marked by double stars, which are also observable
by all market participants, typically trigger immediate trade executions.11 The unmarked
types of events are associated with limit order arrivals or cancellations at suboptimal prices
10An adjustment of the model to the more realistic situation when the hazards of almost contemporaneous
events depend on the state of the market before the earliest of those events occurs is straightforward.
Estimation of the modiﬁed model leads to similar results.
11Occasionally the trades will not be executed automatically following order crossings because of the lack
of mutual credit among the counterparties, communication delays, etc.
12that cannot be observed on the D2000-2 trading screens and therefore constitute private
information of traders.
The events associated with changes of subsidiary quotes and the quantities available at
these quotes are not included into the public information domain, even though some of these
events can be potentially observed by market participants. Therefore, we follow the general
logic of the approach according to which the subsidiary events do not restart the “internal
clock” of the “race” between competing risks and assume that all types of events except A1
through A6, AC6, B1 through B6, and BC6 are unobservable.
4.3 Covariates
In the competing risks framework, the choice of the state space depends on the range of
prices, quantities, and other market characteristics, whose eﬀect on the point processes is in-
vestigated. The range of possible speciﬁcations of the Markov space is ultimately determined
by the objectives of study and often is severely restricted because of the data limitations.
However, in loosely structured problems it is desirable to start with as broad set of variables
as could be reasonably possible. It is desirable that the variables in the state space were
linked to the market factors and identiﬁed from theoretical considerations. These variables
can be discrete or continuous, and the state space might have a fairly complicated topological
structure.12
The full covariate vector z selected for the analysis in this paper is described in Table
2. Along with the “usual suspects” such as the bid-ask spread and the depth of limit order
book on the bid and ask sides, components of the covariate vector include the dynamic
characteristics of market liquidity and order ﬂow, such as the side of the limit order book
where the recent transaction occur, several types of price and quantity changes, and so on.
This choice of covariates is not unique could be easily modiﬁed depending on the structure
of the available data set, for instance, if traders’ identity or relevant information from other
markets were available.
The components of the covariate vector z are divided into the three categories.
4.3.1 Price covariates
• Slippage ≡ diﬀerence between the current midquote
1
2(Pbid +Pask) and the last trans-
action price (measured in 0.0001 DEM);
• Spread>0 ≡ quoted size of the bid-ask spread (measured in 0.0001 DEM) when it is
positive, zero otherwise;
12For instance, if the purpose of research is to study the eﬀect of order clustering at the multiples of ﬁve
ticks, the most natural speciﬁcation of a state variable distinguishes the orders that arrive at the multiples
of 5 ticks, one plus multiples of 5 ticks, two plus multiples of 5 ticks, and so on, like it was done in Osler [43].
13• ∆Pask = Pask−Pask,-1 ≡ change of the best ask price (in 0.0001 DEM) between the last
and second-to-last observable events;
• ∆Pask,-1 = Pask,-1 −Pask,-2 ≡ change of the best ask price (in 0.0001 DEM) between the
second-to-last and third-to-last observable events;
• ∆Pbid = Pbid−Pbid,-1 ≡ change of the best bid price (in 0.0001 DEM) between the last
and second-to-last observable events;
• ∆Pbid,-1 = Pbid,-1 −Pbid,-2 ≡ change of the best bid price (in 0.0001 DEM) between the
second-to-last and third-to-last observable events.
The price covariates characterize the short-term dynamics of the best bid and ask quotes
and their interactions with the most recent transaction prices. These covariates accommodate
short-term deviations of the quoted bid and ask quotes from the long-run equilibria as well
as the potential errors that could be committed in the reconstruction of the trading history.
For instance, the Slippage variable deﬁned as the shift in the market price given by the
midpoint of bid-ask spread relative to the last transaction price may be interpreted as the
midquote positioning bias. One can think of it as a proﬁt accrued to the trader participating
in the last transaction if she liquidates her last trade position at the mid-point of the current
bid-ask spread.13 Since the absolute value of positioning bias is expected to be larger during
the periods of changes in the bid and ask quotes without transaction activity, the Slippage
variable can capture the tradeless price discovery mechanism that might prevail around the
public news announcement. The size of the market bid-ask spread is often associated with
the intuitive notion of illiquidity in the market microstructure literature, and is expected
to have a strong impact on the types of submitted orders, as has been emphasized in the
empirical microstructure literature.
4.3.2 Depth covariates
• log(Qask) ≡ natural logarithm of the market depth quoted on the ask side, i.e., the
value of currency (expressed in $ mln.) available at the best ask price;14
• Q
+
ask ≡ indicator of large depth on the ask side, equals to unity if and only if the ask
market depth is at least $10 mln.;
13This interpretation of positioning bias disregards the transaction cost, which is always incurred by
aggressor (the counterparty initiating the trade) according to the trading protocol of the D2000-2 trading
system.
14During the time period before 1998, the exact value of market depth on the ask and bid sides in the
Reuters trading system was unobservable to market participants when it was in double digits ($10 mln. or
larger). Traders could see only the “R” indicator in the depth part of the screen. Therefore, we set Qask =1 0
and Qbid =1 0e v e r yt i m ew h e nt h ea c t u a lm a r k e td e p t hi sa tl e a s t1 0m i l l i o nU Sd o l l a r s .
14• ∆log(Qask) = log(Qask) − log(Qask,-1) ≡ last change of logarithm of the market depth
quoted on the ask side if the best ask price did not change between the last and
second-to-last observable events, zero otherwise;
• ∆log(Qask,-1) = log(Qask,-1) − log(Qask,-2) ≡ second-to-last change of logarithm of the
market depth quoted on the ask side if the best ask price did not change between the
last and third-to-last observable events, zero otherwise;
• log(Qbid) ≡ natural logarithm of the market depth quoted on the bid side, i.e., the
value of currency (expressed in $ mln.) available at the best bid price;
• Q
+
bid ≡ indicator of large depth on the bid side, equals to unity if and only if the bid
market depth is at least $10 mln.;
• ∆log(Qbid) = log(Qbid) − log(Qbid,-1) ≡ second-to-last change of logarithm of the
market depth quoted on the bid side if the best bid price did not change between the
last and third-to-last observable events, zero otherwise;
• ∆log(Qbid,-1)=l o g ( Qbid,-1) − log(Qbid,-2) ≡ second-to-last change of logarithm of the
market depth quoted on the bid side if the best bid price did not change between the
last and third-to-last observable events, zero otherwise.
The two market depth variables represent the second dimension of liquidity identiﬁed
in the introduction to this paper, speciﬁcally, how many units of asset can be bought (or
sold) at the current ask (or bid) market prices. The depth covariates are also expected
to be signiﬁcant for the risks of cancellations since the likelihood of a cancellation event is
expected to be positively related to the total number of active limit orders, and the latter
number is correlated with the quoted depth at the best market price. Similarly to the quoted
prices, the changes of quoted quantities capture the more subtle traders’ reaction to changes
in the publicly available information on the limit order book and private information from





nonlinearities in the dependence of market activity on the depth variables (which might be
partially justiﬁed by unobservable exact levels of depth when the market depth exceeds $10
mln.)
4.3.3 Order ﬂow and transaction level covariates
• Side ≡ directional indicator of the last transaction (+1 for seller-initiated trades, −1
for buyer-initiated trades);
• Side−1 ≡ directional indicator of the second-to-last transaction (+1 for seller-initiated
trades, −1 for buyer-initiated trades);
15• F0−500 ≡ the signed order ﬂow (measured as the diﬀerence between the number of seller-
and buyer-initiated transactions) in the ﬁve-second period prior to the last observable
event;
• F5−1000,F 10−1500,F 15−3000,F 30−6000,F 1−20,F 2−50 and F5−150 are similarly deﬁned as the
signed order ﬂow over the time periods ﬁve to ten seconds, ten to 15 seconds, and so
on, prior to the last observable event;
• T0−500 ≡ the trade (measured as the total number of transactions) in the ﬁve-second
period prior to the last observable event;
• T5−1000,T 10−1500,T 15−3000,T 30−6000,T 1−20,T 2−50 and T5−150 are similarly deﬁned as the
number of transactions in the electronic system in the periods ﬁve to ten seconds, ten
to 15 seconds, and so on, prior to the last observable event.
Side, which is the indicator of aggressor in the most recent transaction, characterizes the
asymmetry in the impact of completed transactions on the hazard rates as opposed to the
asymmetry in the impact of aggressive quotes captured by other variables, since the quotes
that occur without transactions only indicate the intention to trade,n o tt h ea c t u a lt r a d e s .
There is a strong evidence that the buy-sell indicator has a high predictive power for the
direction of future transactions on the foreign exchange market (Goodhart et al. [22]) and
on the stock markets (Hausman et al. [30], Lo et al. [37], Huang and Stoll [32]).
The additional activity and order ﬂow covariates denoted, respectively, by F(τ0;τ1] and
T(τ0;τ1], attempt to capture some of the lower-frequency serial dependence in the market
dynamics. Linear combinations of such variables for various time lags τ0 and τ1 take the
form of diﬀerences between the long and short-run moving averages of signed order ﬂow and
trading activity, they should incorporate the inﬂuence of common factors contributing to the
unobserved heterogeneity that cannot be captured by the current state of the limit order
book. Since the failure to account for the unobserved common factors may invalidate the
conditional independence assumption which is one of the foundations of the competing risks
framework, the variables representing the trade and activity history are chosen to capture a
substantial part of the lower-frequency serial dependence, at the same time striking a balance
between the correct speciﬁcation and empirical tractability of the model.15
15An alternative lagged activity measure given by the amplitude of transaction price ﬂuctuations in a
given time interval leads to qualitatively similar estimation results. Extension of the model to incorporate
the dynamic error correction terms in the spirit of the ACD model (Engle and Russell [14]) is currently under
investigation. Results of that study will be reported in a separate paper.
165 Empirical Results
Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the estimated coeﬃcients of the Cox proportional hazard covariates
for the competing risks of arrivals and cancellations of sell-side limit orders and for the
sell market orders. Only events recorded during the ﬁrst three days of the week, October
6—8, 1997, between 6 a.m. and 5 p.m. GMT, which are the most liquid trading hours in
the Reuters D2000-2 trading system, have been used for the analysis.16 Signiﬁcance of the
covariate coeﬃcients is determined from the robust t-statistics (Lin and Wei [36]) at the 99%
level, and the statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are shown in small script. The qualitative
eﬀects of covariates for buy-side events are determined analogously. They closely mirror the
covariate eﬀects for sell-side events (Tables 6, 7, and 8).
The empirical regularities uncovered by the Cox proportional hazard regressions can be
assigned to one of the three groups depending on whether they are associated with shifts in
the price levels, changes of market depth, or changes in the signed order ﬂow. Accordingly,
they are discussed in subsections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 below. The location of coeﬃcients in
Tables 3—8 providing evidence in support of these empirical facts is indicated in parentheses.
5.1 Change of the Best Bid and Ask Quotes and Transaction Re-
turns
1. (The top three entries of column 2 in Tables 3 and 6.) The hazard rates of aggressive
limit order arrivals tend to be more sensitive than the hazard rates of market order
arrivals to the shifts in midquote levels, even though the dependence of hazard rates is
qualitatively similar for market orders and aggressive limit orders. This is consistent
with the theoretical prediction of Foucault [16] and the empirical ﬁnding of Daníelsson
and Payne [10]. In other words, the stronger upward price adjustment without trades
implies smaller proportion of market orders in the seller-initiated ﬂow of transactions
and larger proportion of market orders in the buyer-initiated ﬂow of transactions.
2. (Column 2 in Tables 3 and 6.) Negative signs of Slippagecoeﬃcients for the submission
and cancellation rates of subsidiary sell limit orders and positive signs of Slippage
coeﬃcients for the submissions and cancellation rates of subsidiary buy limit orders
support the hypothesis that the general level of subsidiary limit order submission and
cancellation activity declines when the midpoint of bid-ask spread moves closer to the
limit order and this move is not accompanied by any transactions. In this case, the
previously submitted orders are less likely to be cancelled, and the new orders are less
likely to arrive. The overall eﬀect of the Slippage variable is less obvious when the last
16The last two trading days of the sample are reserved for out-of-sample evaluation of the forecasts.
17transaction leads to asymmetric changes in the best quoted prices and the depth at
these prices. In this case, the interpretation becomes complicated because of migration
of submission and cancellation events between alternative classes of risk every time the
reference quotes (Pask or Pbid)a r em o d i ﬁed.
3. (The top section of column 3 in Tables 3 and 6.) There is a strong negative association
between the transaction intensity and bid-ask spread, and a strong positive association
between the rate of large price improvements and bid-ask spread. Also we found a fairly
strong negative association between the subsidiary order arrival activity and the size
of the bid-ask spread. On surface, this last result appears to contradict the empirical
evidence from Biais et al. [4] and Holliﬁeld et al. [31]. Notice, however, that our results
are obtained for the spread sensitivity of hazard rates of subsidiary limit order arrivals,
while the results in the previous literature were established for the spread sensitivity
of probability that the next event will be subsidiary order arrival.
4. (Column 3 in Tables 3 and 6.) Even though the fresh supply of liquidity (in the
form of subsidiary limit order arrivals) and fresh demand for liquidity (in the form of
aggressive limit and market order arrivals) are negatively related to the size of bid-ask
spread, there is also negative association between the cancellation rates of previously
submitted subsidiary limit orders and the size of bid-ask spread. The eﬀect of spread
on the net supply of subsidiary liquidity is close to neutral. The only type of liquidity
that is unambiguously positively associated with the size of bid-ask spread comes from
large price improvements that occur much more often when the spread exceeds two
ticks. Otherwise, the liquidity supply appears to be fairly steady and driven primarily
by short-term price ﬂuctuations and trends and changes in the depth of the limit order
book.
5. (The top three entries of column 5 in Tables 3 and 6.) Sell market orders are dis-
couraged by bid price improvement; buy market orders are discouraged by ask price
improvement. This “contrarian” property of market orders is in contrast with the
properties of aggressive limit orders that appear to be more frequent following price
improvements on the opposite side of the book. However one should be aware of the
possibility of mechanical misclassiﬁcation of limit orders as being “aggressive” since a
larger proportion of sell limit orders submitted at the same prices overlap with higher
bid quotes, and a larger proportion of buy limit orders overlap with lower ask quotes,
even though the quote changes might be transitory price swings without any informa-
tion content.
6. (The top ﬁve entries of column 4 in Tables 3 and 6.) Arrivals of market sell orders
and aggressive limit sell orders, as well as ask price improvements (but not the ask
18depth improvements) are more likely to occur after recent ask quote deteriorations
(increases). A similar regularity is observed on the buy side of the market with regard
to recent bid quote deteriorations (decreases).
7. (The mid-section of columns 4 and 5 in Tables 3 and 6.) The arrival and cancellation
rates of subsidiary limit orders positioned several ticks above the current ask and several
ticks below current bid market prices are negatively aﬀected by recent deteriorations of
best quoted prices on the same side and recent improvements of best quoted prices on
the opposite side of the limit order book. A similar negative reaction to recent quoted
price improvements on the opposite side of the book is observed for the arrival rates of
price and quantity improving orders. In summary, price improvements on one side of
the market are more likely to be followed by reduced liquidity provision on the other
side of the market.
5.2 Depth of the Limit Order Book at the Best Bid and Ask
Quotes
1. (The top six entries of column 6 in Tables 3 and 6.) The arrival rates for sell market
orders and aggressive sell limit orders, as well as the rates of ask price and quantity
improvements are higher when depth on the ask side of the limit order book is high.
A similar eﬀect is observed on the buy side of the limit order book. This points to the
competition among aggressive limit order traders for time priority in trade execution
as one of the driving forces behind the price improvement and transaction activities.
2. (The seventh and eighth entries of column 6 in Tables 3 and 6.) The arrival rates for
subsidiary limit orders at the price levels next to the best market bid and ask quotes
are negatively aﬀected by large depth at the best market quotes. This points to the
competition among less aggressive limit order traders as the abundant liquidity on the
market discourages limit order submission at inferior prices.
3. (The third and seventh entries of column 7 in Tables 3 and 6.) Depth improvements
at the best market quote become more likely after another depth improvement event
at the same price market quote. This provides an evidence that liquidity tends to
accumulate at the best market quotes once the market conﬁrms these quotes as the
new price levels. Depth improvements at the ask market price also encourage sell
market order submission but do not aﬀect the rates of ask price improvement. In fact,
this mechanism is predominantly at work when the possibilities of price improvement
have been already exhausted (and the market spread is one tick or smaller).17
17Additional Cox regressions for these events run separately for the periods of small and large spread
194. (The top three entries of column 8 in Tables 3 and 6.) A tentative evidence that buy
market orders arrive more actively during the periods of intermediate depth (less than
$10 mln.) and less actively during the periods of large depth (at least $10 mln. or
more) at the best ask price was not found for the arrivals of aggressive buy limit orders.
Similar eﬀects are observed for sell market orders and aggressive sell limit orders. On
the other hand, the arrival intensity of very aggressive limit orders (submitted at the
prices above the best ask and below the best bid quotes) appears to decline as the
level of depth on the opposite side of the limit order book increases. This can be easily
justiﬁed from the observation that very aggressive limit orders are more likely to be
used during the periods of scarce liquidity (low depth) at the best market bid and ask
quotes.
5. (Column 9 in Tables 3 and 6.) There is strong evidence that bid and ask depth
improvement events without price improvements encourage cancellations of subsidiary
limit orders on the opposite side of the book and discourage liquidity demand coming
in the form of aggressive limit and market orders from the opposite side of the market.
Moreover, the deteriorating level of depth at the best market quotes encourages traders
on the opposite side of the market to chase more aggressively the remaining liquidity
at these quotes and avoid cancellations of subsidiary limit orders on the opposite side
of the market.
6. (The bottom section of column 9 in Tables 3 and 6.) The limit order cancellation rates
at the best bid and ask prices tend to decrease after increases in the observed depth on
the opposite side of the limit order book. The increasing depth encourages limit order
traders on the opposite side of the book to keep his order at the best market price only
if he knows that he will be the ﬁrst trader to receive this price.18
5 . 3 L a g g e dO r d e rF l o wa n dT r a n s a c t i o nA c t i v i t y
1. (The top section of columns 2—4 in Tables 4 and 7.) The arrival rates of sell market
orders, aggressive sell limit orders, and market ask price improvements increase after
seller-initiated transactions and decrease after buyer-initiated transactions. A similar
eﬀect is detected on the opposite side of the limit order book. This clustering of the
buyer and seller pressure is consistent with the ample evidence of strong high-frequency
conﬁrm this hypothesis.
18This is conﬁrmed by additional Cox regressions (not shown in Tables 3 and 6) run separately for can-
cellation events leading to price deterioration and leading to depth deterioration without change of the best
quoted price.
20directional momentum observed on foreign exchange and stock markets and reported
in previous studies.19
2. (The bottom section of columns 2—5 in Tables 4 and 7.) There is evidence of higher
cancellation rates for subsidiary sell limit orders up to ten seconds after seller-initiated
transactions and lower cancellation rates for subsidiary sell limit orders up to ten
seconds after buyer-initiated transactions. A similar eﬀect is detected for subsidiary
buy limit orders. This can be generally interpreted as an evidence of limit order book
updating by order anticipators receiving signal that the trading pressure is shifting
market price in the opposite direction.
3. (The mid-section of columns 5—9 in Tables 4 and 7.) The prolonged periods of low
submission rates for subsidiary ask limit orders are more likely to occur following the
periods of massive seller-initiated transaction activity. However, only a weak evidence
of similar eﬀects is found for subsidiary bid limit orders. An explanation can be based
on the common perception of the US dollar in the late 1990s as a currency with
stronger fundamentals than the Deutsche Mark, which could be translated into the
lower sensitivity of limit order bids to strong “Buy” signals. However, this apparent
asymmetry may also be period-speciﬁc.
4. (Tables 5 and 8.) The model provides empirical support for the observation that order
submission and order cancellation rates increase after the periods of high transaction
activity. The eﬀect of transaction activity is very persistent at all price levels in the
limit order book. Interestingly, the persistence of activity appears to be stronger for
the arrival rates of subsidiary limit orders relative to other types of events. This
also points to subsidiary limit orders and, more generally, to stop-loss order execution
activity (Osler [42]) as a possible transmission mechanism of shocks and the source of
memory and fat tails in the foreign exchange returns.
5.4 Summary
The nature of competition among aggressive and non-aggressive traders can be summarized
by the following digest of the main empirical implications of the continuous time model.
Special attention is drawn to the role of price and depth improvements with and without
trade for the price discovery process.
• The continuous time model estimated in this section implies that the buy market
order activity is spurred by depth improvements due to higher competition of limit
19Lo et al. [37] report similar results for limit order data collected from stock markets. Hausman et al.
[30] reports similar ﬁndings for transaction level data.
21order traders for time priority on the bid side. On the other hand, the buy market
order activity is deterred if depth improvements on the ask side are not accompanied
by simultaneous price improvements (i.e., spread reductions).
• The buy market order activity is encouraged by bid quote improvements originating
from the competing limit order buyers, and by ask quote improvements originating
from the providers of liquidity on the sell side of the market. However, the eﬀect of a
bid quote improvement on the buy market order activity is captured almost entirely
by the concurrent reduction of the bid-ask spread, and appears to be much smaller in
magnitude.
• In the time period covered by our data, price improvements by competitors generally
encouraged liquidity provision, while depth improvements on the opposite side made
aggressive limit order and market order traders defer their transactions and consider
taking diﬀerent actions.
• Overall, the prevalence of buyer-initiated trades among the recent transactions encour-
aged the buy market order activity. Similar eﬀects are observed on the opposite side
of the market for seller-initiated trades.
6 Principal Components of Activity Indices
The main purpose of principal component analysis (PCA) in the present context is reduction
of a large set of competing risk indices to a much smaller set of indices (factors) that still
generate most of short-term market dynamics. Besides the data compression, PCA represents
an important step toward automatic and eﬃcient generation of short-term forecasts for the
market activity. In retrospect, careful inspection of the market activity levels around the
times of likely news arrivals reveals a typical market reaction pattern, which starts with a
sudden and numerous withdrawals of orders on the “weaker” side of the market as it comes
under pressure. The limit order withdrawals are accompanied by larger than usual values
of bid-ask spread and strong directional trading volume driven primarily by market orders.
This activity creates a considerable imbalance between the number of buy and sell orders in
the limit order book, which is gradually restored after the prices adjust to the new level. The
price adjustment occurs in a staggering wave-like fashion and is accompanied by higher than
usual volatility of the price. No matter whether the news conﬁrmed dealers’ expectations
about Bundesbank cutting German interest rates, the government crisis in Italy, or their
worries about East Asian ﬁnancial markets, as long as the pattern of traders’ reaction to
such information has some common characteristics, it may be captured by a small number
22of principal components that could potentially be much smaller than the number of market
participants or the number of initially identiﬁed market components.
The version of PCA conducted in this section is based on the analysis of the sample
variance-covariance matrix b Σ of competing risk indices yr = z0βr, r =1 ,...,R.M a t r i xb Σ is
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and contains a large amount of information about the contemporaneous variations in the
components of covariate vector Z characterizing the state of the limit order book. The data
compression can be achieved since PCA approximates the parametric covariate-dependent
competing risk indices yr = z0βr by alternative risk indices e yr = f0γr that depend on a
small set of Q common factors f =( f1,...,f Q)0. These factors are formed as simple linear
combinations of the covariates with the coeﬃcients chosen in such a way that the ﬁrst factor
f1 explains the largest portion of the sample variance-covariance matrix20 of the competing
risk indices, the second factor f2 explains the next largest portion, and so on. The factors
constructed in such a manner and normalized to have unit variance are called the principal
components,o rPCA risk factors. Then the factor loadings of these observable factors (which
are, by construction, the linear combinations of covariates) can be obtained by application
of standard regression techniques.
6.1 Relative Contributions of PCA Factors
Since, mathematically, the principal components are normalized eigenvectors of the variance-
covariance matrix b Σ, their number is equal to the number of competing risk indices R.A s
the last few eigenvectors of b Σ point to the directions where the risk indices f1,f 2,. . . ,f R
jointly exhibit little or no variation, most of the information content of the data is likely
to be represented by some smaller number of PCA risk factors f1,...,f Q, Q<R .I n f a c t ,
20Since the ultimate goal of analysis in this chapter is construction of short-term forecasts of trading
activity, our main concern to the end of this chapter will be approximating the short-run variances and
covariances of the competing risk indices. Therefore, the analysis throughout the rest of this chapter will be
based primarily on the properties of short-run variances and covariances. It remains to be seen whether the
similar data compression performed at the lower frequencies leads to useful forecasts.
23the situation when Q ¿ R, and the principal components f1,...,fQ result in a much smaller
data set, also cannot be ruled out.
The importance of PCA risk factors f1,f 2,. . . ,f Q across the set of competing risk indices
is measured by the eigenvalues λ1,λ 2,. . . ,λ Q of the extracted factors. In particular, the















The natural question arises as to how many principal components should be retained to
capture systematic variation in the original data set and avoid capturing what is likely to
be a random noise. Since there is no single universally accepted statistical approach in the
statistical literature to the number of PCA factors to be retained, it would be reasonable to
take an eclectic approach applying a spectrum of alternative criteria to this problem.
Figure 10 represents the so-called scree plot showing the eigenvalues corresponding to
the ﬁrst 13 principal components against the number of those components. Inspection of
the graph suggests that the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors capture the major portion of variation
in the risk indices, even though the sixth and seventh factors might also be marginally
important. Table 13 shows that the ﬁrst seven PCA factors capture almost 90% of variation
in the indices, whereas the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors capture almost 86% of the variation. The
“subjective” choice of Q =5appears to be reasonable in the present context.
There is a large number of “objective” decision rules frequently applied to decide on the
number of “signiﬁcant” principal components to be retained. Jolliﬀe [34], Chapter 6 gives
a good survey of formal and informal approaches, while Jackson [33] investigates perfor-
mance of alternative decision rules applied to some artiﬁcial and real data. Even though a
large amount of research has been done on the rules for choosing the number of retained
components, there is no universally accepted rule that is applied in the literature in all
circumstances.
One of the popular statistical decision rules which is strongly favored in Jackson [33] can
be derived from the so-called broken stick model (Frontier [18]). According to this model,
if the total variance, represented by the sum of the eigenvalues of the variance-covariance
matrix of indices, can be divided randomly among Q components, then the distribution of












when the number of components Q is large enough. One way of deciding whether the pro-
portion of variance accounted by the kth PCA factor is suﬃciently large for this component
to be retained is to compare this proportion with λ
∗
k. The test based on λ
∗
k leads to the
24conclusion that the ﬁrst four components should be retained. However, since there are no
systematic results on the size and power properties of the “broken stick” rule based on the
expected eigenvalues, and in view of frequently cited evidence that the rule retains too few
components, we check for the number of components using a bootstrap procedure that recov-
ers the entire distribution of the kth largest eigenvalue under the null of equal eigenvalues for
the last Q−k+1PCA factors. This alternative procedure leads to the conclusion that Q =5
components should be retained, with the ﬁfth component being only marginally signiﬁcant
at the 95% conﬁdence level.
Yet another, rather subjective procedure for selection of the number of retained com-
ponents uses the method of log-eigenvalue (LEV) diagrams (Wilks [45], Chapter 9). The
method is motivated by the idea that, if the last R−Q principal components pick up random
noise, then the magnitudes of their eigenvalues decrease exponentially with the component
number. The Q retained PCA factors correspond to the log-eigenvalues deviating from the
straight-line portion of the plot on the LEV diagram. Figure 11 shows that the LEV plot
deviates from the linear pattern implied by exponential decay of the plot under the null
hypothesis of random noise for the number of factors as low as ﬁve. Even though it can-
not be unambiguously seen on the plot that Q =5 , it appears to be a reasonable choice
again. Therefore, the further analysis will be conducted for ﬁve PCA factors. However, to
ensure robustness of our results, we repeated the analyses for seven retained PCA factors
and obtained similar results.
6.2 Interpretation of PCA Factors
Table 9 gives the representations of covariates in the original Cox proportional hazard re-
gressions for the competing risks in terms of the extracted PCA factors. Tables 10, 11, and
12 report the estimates b γr of factor loadings on the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors in the semipara-
metric Cox proportional hazard model for the competing risk indices e yr = f0b γr of sell order
arrivals, buy order arrivals, and cancellation activity in the limit order book, respectively.
The estimation period is between 6 a.m. and 5 p.m. GMT on the week of October 6-8, 1997.
The t-statistics for the estimates of Tables 10, 11, and 12 are shown in parentheses, and
statistically signiﬁcant factor loading estimates coeﬃcients (at the 95% level) are marked by
stars. To facilitate interpretation of the extracted PCA factors, we also show the oﬀ-diagonal
and diagonal terms of the cross-correlogram (Figures 12 and 13, respectively) for the ﬁrst
ﬁve PCA factors.
The ﬁrst principal component, which is obviously nonstationary, dominates the dynamics
of risk indices. The ﬁrst PCA factor captures approximately 44% of the total variation in
the covariate indices of the competing risks. Since all types of risk have large positive factor
loadings on the ﬁrst factor, the ﬁrst component can be readily interpreted as the general
level of limit order book activity.
25The second principal component contributes less than 16% to the total variation of risk
indices dynamics. Inspection of its autocorrelogram reveals its stationarity, and its cross-
correlogram with the ﬁrst principal component shows that they interact only marginally at
all leads and lags. The factor loadings on the second factor are uniformly positive for log-
hazard rates of buyer-initiated events (associated with submission and cancellation of bid
limit orders and buy market orders) and almost uniformly negative for the log-hazards of
seller-initiated events. Therefore, we can interpret the second factor as the short-term activity
momentum,w h i c hi d e n t i ﬁe st h em o r ea c t i v es i d eo ft h el i m i to r d e rb o o k( b u yo rs e l l )w i t h o u t
diﬀerentiating across the types of activity (whether it is submission or cancellation of limit
or market orders). Since the active order-driven market intrinsically represents the dynamic
interaction of buyers and sellers, it should be no surprise that buyers’ or sellers’ actions
cannot dominate the market for long periods of time. Indeed, the autocorrelation of this
factor becomes indistinguishable from zero for lags as low as 50 time periods (epochs), where
e a c he p o c hi sa s s u m e dt ob et e r m i n a t e db ya no b s e r v a b l el i m i to r d e rb o o ke v e n ta n dl a s t s
about one second on average during the hours of liquid trading.
The third principal component capturing 12.4% of variation in the hazard rate dynamics
has slowly decaying autocorrelogram and therefore has long memory. The rate of decay
of its autocorrelogram on Figure 13, characterizing persistence of the third PCA factor,
is close to the rate of decay of the autocorrelogram for the ﬁrst factor. Similarly to the
second principal component, the third PCA factor is uncorrelated to the ﬁr s tf a c t o ra ta l l
leads and lags but interacts rather non-trivially with the second principal component. Since
the factor loadings of the third component are negative for submissions of non-aggressive
bids and aggressive seller-initiated orders, and positive for submissions of non-aggressive ask
orders and aggressive buyer-initiated orders, we can think of the third factor as the “buying
pressure” on the market. The cancellation activity pattern that can be uncovered from the
factor loadings of cancellation risks generally countervails those for the second PCA factor
(short-term activity momentum) and conforms to the intuitive notion of “buying pressure.”
Aggressive buyers who tend to cancel buy limit orders several ticks below the market bid
price, keep limit orders just below the market bid price in the hope of price reversal, and do
just the opposite on the ask side of the market. Interestingly, since the cancellation activity
patterns at the best market bid and ask quotes are similar to the submission patterns at
the more competitive prices (leading to price improvement and narrowing the spread), this
also conforms to the activity of aggressive sellers who might be testing the market before
resubmitting their orders if their earlier oﬀers have not been hit promptly.
The analysis of cross-correlations between factors 2 and 3 is conducted using the aug-
mented graph of autocorrelogram highlighting the interaction between factors 2 and 3 (Figure
14). The graph shows that the unusually low activity on the ask-side of the limit order book
relative to the bid side (small values of factor 2) precede the aggressive buyer pressure (high
values of factor 3), leading to moderately higher ask-side activity in the short run that even-
26tually reverts to persistently lower ask-side activity in the long run. This observation reveals
the non-trivial interaction between the two factors, which implies a richer story than most
theoretical microstructure models can tell.
Since the interpretation of the consecutive principal components becomes increasingly
diﬃc u l t ,w em a k ea na t t e m p tt oi n t e r p r e to n l yt h ef o u r t ha n dﬁfth components that con-
tribute, respectively, to 9% and 4.7% of variation in the parametric parts of the log-hazard
rates of competing risks. The loadings on factor 4 appear symmetric for buyer- and seller-
initiated events, and are positive for limit order submissions within the spread that do not
cause immediate transactions, as well as for limit order at least ﬁve ticks away from the
prevailing market bid-ask spread. The loadings on factor 4 are negative for the arrivals of
market and limit orders causing transactions, as well as for submissions and cancellations
of subsidiary orders in the vicinity of the market bid-ask spread. Therefore, high values of
factor 4 can be associated with the tendency to quote more competitive prices within the
spread, while high values of factor 4 are associated with the tendency to take limit orders on
the opposite side of the book without much bargaining. Therefore, low values of factor 4 can
be associated with “choppy” markets when trades tend to occur without much bargaining,
which often happens at the high levels of the market spread and might be associated with the
relatively high adverse selection component (Harris [26]). We may attach the term “adverse
selection” to the fourth PCA factor, and stick to the terminology in the future.
Note that the “adverse selection” factor does not appear to interact much with any of
the other major principal components except the ﬁrst one, which provides an illustration of
the frequently reported phenomenon that the general level of trading activity is higher when
some information is present in the market (i.e., the “adverse selection” component is high).
Indeed, active markets lead to higher competition among traders who tend to submit more
quotes before making a deal. The inverse causality also appears to be at work. Trading at
the relatively large levels of bid-ask spread might be a signal of “choppy market,” at least for
some, presumably uninformed, traders, causing adjustments of their quotes until the market
returns to the “smoother” state.
Finally, we make an attempt to interpret the ﬁfth PCA factor. The loadings on this factor
are positive for all aggressive buy limit order arrivals and cancellations, for submissions of buy
limit orders well below the bid market price, for submissions of sell limit orders just above
the ask market price, and for all cancellations of subsidiary limit orders on the ask side.
In all other cases, the loadings on factor 5 are negative and their signs and magnitudes are
roughly symmetric to the signs and magnitudes of this factor loadings for similar risks on the
opposite side of the book. Even though, in many respects, factor 5 behaves similarly to factor
3, large values of factor 5 imply that the aggressive buyer activity tends to be accompanied
by cancellations of subsidiary sell limit orders rather than arrivals of subsidiary sell limit
orders, in contrast to factor 3. Also, factor 5 does not appear to be as persistent as factor 3
(Figures 13 and 14), and generally is more sensitive to the changes of depth (Table 9). All
27these properties might be interpreted as a tentative evidence of directional information on
the market that signals a permanent shift of the market price in the near future. For this
reason we will call the ﬁfth PCA factor the “bull market momentum”.
In a small forecasting exercise of the next section, the second, third, and ﬁfth principal
components come out as the major determinants of directional activity in the limit order
book, whereas the ﬁrst and fourth principal components aﬀect only the absolute level of
activity in the limit order book.
7 Evaluation of Probability Forecasts
In this section, we generate probability forecasts for the next limit order book event based on
the formulas shown in Appendix B. Then we apply the method of reliability diagrams (Wilks
[45], Chapter 7) to measure goodness-of-ﬁto ft h eﬁve-factor principal component competing
risks model (section 6) calibrated to the data collected over the liquid trading period (6
a.m. to 5 p.m. GMT) on October 6—8, 1997, and evaluate the out-of-sample predictive
performance of this model in the liquid trading period on October 9—10, 1997. This exercise
is especially interesting since the out-of-sample period in our data set is dominated by highly
volatile trading following the Bundesbank announcement about an increase in the repo rate
around 11:30 a.m. GMT on Thursday, October 9, 1997. The volatility and spread over a
large portion of the out-of-sample period remained much higher than they were during the
period October 6—8, 1997. The ability of the competing risks model calibrated on historical
data to generate credible out-of-sample probability forecasts will be a clear indicator of its
promise in improvement of short-term probability forecasts of market events and in their
applications to the analysis of alternative scenarios in real time.
The probability estimates (11) and (12) in Appendix B form the backbone of our fore-
casting results. We set t0 =0in the formulas (11) and (12), since these probabilities are
evaluated immediately after the limit order book gets updated. The forecasts constructed
by these formulas can be made dynamic in the sense that they take into account the passage
of time as the duration t0 of uneventful period is steadily growing from zero to the moment
of epoch termination.
7.1 Classiﬁcation of Forecasted Events
In the present paper, we concentrate on the directional forecasts for future transactions.
Direction of future transaction is an important issue for limit order traders and their sponsors
who are intrinsically interested in fast execution of their limit orders at favorable prices. The
prevalence of buyer- or seller-initiated transactions on the market may be intimately, but
non-trivially related to the appreciation or depreciation of exchange rates as it might signal
28the informational advantage of the counterparties initiating the trades. Investigation of
dynamic links between the order ﬂow, appreciation or depreciation of transaction price, and
various measures of limit order book liquidity is a dominant topic in the modern empirical
microstructure literature and one of the main objectives of the present research. Therefore
it would be natural to verify the ability of the model to issue the warnings about unusually
high or low probabilities of transactions on the sell and buy side of the limit order book.
First, we evaluate the ability of the PCA factor model with ﬁve principal components
(section 6), based on the estimates of risk indices e yr = f0γr reported in Tables 10, 11,
and 12, to provide a good in-sample ﬁt between the realized and forecast probabilities of
buyer- and seller-initiated transactions. As we have some freedom to select the number of
event categories, we choose a coarser event classiﬁcation scheme than the one with S =1 4
observable risks used in the original model estimated in section 5. Even though we started
with S =1 4observable risks (marked by single and double stars in Table 1), their number was
later reduced by pooling the events of types A1, A2, A3 in the “Sell Trade” category AA and
the events of types B1, B2, B3 in the “Buy Trade” category BB, and by collapsing the events
of types A4 and A5 into the “Ask Price Improvement” category AP+ and the events of types
B 4a n dB 5i nt ot h e“ B i dP r i c eI m p r o v e m e n t ”c a t e g o r yB P +. The composition of the event
classes A6, B6, AC6, and BC6 corresponding, respectively, to “Ask Depth Improvement”,
“Bid Depth Improvement”, “Ask Touch Cancellation”, and “Bid Touch Cancellation” events
were unchanged but the categories were renamed as AD+,B D +,A −,a n dB −, respectively.
The modiﬁed event classiﬁcation scheme with S =8observable categories is shown in Table
14.
Figure 15 gives an example of dynamic evolution of forecast probabilities for buyer- and
seller-initiated transactions. The sample period shown on the graph is chosen to be identical
to the one used to demonstrate the evolution of bid, ask, and transaction prices on Figure
9. The probability forecasts are based on formulas (9) and (10) from Appendix B and
evaluated under the assumption that no events occurred at least for one second after the
previous observable limit order book event, which explicitly takes into account the reaction
time of the potential forecast user. The ﬁrst seven minutes of the sample period captured
on Figures 9 and 15 was the period of heavy buyer pressure accompanied by a rapid growth
of market price by almost ten tick points. This was also the period when our competing
risks model produces the probability forecasts which are much larger for buy than for sell
transactions. The last portion of the sample covers the period when the price stabilizes
just under the new level DEM 1.7575 per US dollar and is supported by a fairly strong
“resistance” on the sell side. The sell and buy transaction probability forecasts for this
period are approximately equal to each other on average, even though the fraction of epochs
terminated by seller-initiated transactions is slightly higher than predicted in this subperiod.
297.2 Reliability Plots for In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Forecasts
The quality of probability forecasts based on formulas (9) and (10) from Appendix B is
evaluated using the method of reliability diagrams (Wilks [45], Chapter 7). The graphs on
Figure 16 show the reliability plots for the forecasts of buyer- and seller-initiated transactions
made under assumption that no events occurred at least for one second after the previous
observable limit order book event. The ﬁrst two graphs show the reliability plots for the
probability forecasts ofbuyer-initiated transactions (graph 1) and seller-initiated transactions
(graph 2) matched with the frequencies of buyer- and seller-initiated transactions observed
over the estimation period of the ﬁrst three days (31391 epochs). The graphs in the lower
portion of Figure 16 show the reliability plots for the probability forecasts of buyer- and seller-
initiated trades (graphs 3 and 4, respectively) when the forecast probabilities are matched
with the corresponding transaction frequencies observed in the out-of-sample period covering
the last two days (19385 epochs). Both sell and buy event forecasts oﬀer high resolution with
a broad range of covered probabilities. The forecasts also have good reliability properties
as they do not reveal a strong tendency to deviate systematically from the main diagonal
line that corresponds to perfect reliability. Even though the probability forecasts slightly
underpredict the probabilities of buy and sell trades when the predicted probabilities are
very small, this tendency towards overconﬁdence (underprediction of unlikely seller- and
buyer-initiated transactions) is fairly weak. The overconﬁdence (underprediction) bias for
the rare events is slightly stronger when the forecasts are evaluated out-of-sample, which
can be easily detected from the deviations of left tails of reliability plots on the last two
graphs from the perfect reliability line. This might be an issue of concern if the forecasts
are ultimately used to measure the risk of transactions that might occur in the undesirable
direction. However, even with this small caveat that must be taken into consideration by
the ultimate users of forecast, the out-of-sample performance of the competing risks model
turns out to be surprisingly good.
The high degree of persistence detected on the diagrams for cross-correlograms of PCA
factors (Figures 16 and 17) suggests that at least some of the factors are unlikely to change
much over a relatively short time period that might be covering more than one epoch.
Therefore, it may be interesting to compare the quality of forecasting rules that rely on the
principal components derived from the competing risks model and the performance of some
benchmark forecasting rules based on the current and lagged directional indicators. In our
last exercise, we evaluate the quality of forecasts for the event that the next transaction in the
limit order book will be initiated by buyer or seller within the next 30 seconds, or no trade
will be recorded in the next 30 seconds since the time of forecast. The “naïve” benchmark
used in our comparisons will be based on the trinomial logit regression of buy, sell, or no-
trade indicator with the covariates given by the signs of ten most recent transactions (±1
if transaction was initiated by seller/buyer, and zero if no transaction occurred). The only
30information used to predict the direction of next transaction in this simple “directional
momentum” model is the direction of the last several trades. The performance of this simple
forecasting model will be compared with the multinomial logit model with the index of
covariates given by the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors.21
The two diagrams on the left-hand side of Figure 17 show the reliability plots for the
forecast of the event that the next limit order book transaction will be buyer-initiated and
occur in 30 seconds after the time of forecast. Similarly, the two diagrams on the right-hand
side of Figure 17 show the reliability plots for probability forecasts of the event that the next
transaction in limit order book will be seller-initiated and occur in 30 seconds since the time
of forecast. The reliability plots in the upper portion of Figure 17 are based on the trinomial
logit regression with the covariates given by the ﬁve competing risks PCA factors. The
reliability plots in the bottom portion of Figure 17 are based on the benchmark forecasting
model based on the trinomial logit regression with the covariates given by signs of last 10
transactions (±1 for transactions initiated by seller/buyer). All diagrams are produced from
the sample covering the estimation period 6 am to 5 pm GMT on October 6—8, 1997.
Since the plots on the upper two diagrams on Figure 17 match very closely the main
diagonal, we can conclude that the PCA factor model ﬁts the data much better than the
“naïve” benchmark based on the directional indicators. Moreover, the PCA factor model
also has better discrimination properties as the range of probability forecasts based on this
model is substantially wider. Apart from the slight downward bias of probability forecasts
for small probabilities, the PCA factor model appears to provide a better ﬁt to the empirical
data in comparison to the alternative model.
Now we check whether the PCA factor model is capable of giving the warnings about
unusually high (or unusually low) probabilities that the next limit order book transaction
will be buyer- or seller-initiated. Figure 18 is similar to Figure 17, except that it shows
the reliability plots of forecasts matched to the data from the out-of-sample period 6 am
to 5 pm GMT on October 9 and October 10, 1997. Again, the PCA factor model delivers
the forecasts that are more reliable and have much better resolution properties than the
forecasts based on the alternative “momentum-based” model. Figure 18 also indicates a
problem that seems to deteriorate with the forecast horizon.22 In particular, the forecasts
based on our model appear to be overconﬁdent in the sense that the model underpredicts
low probability events (left tails on the reliability plots are bent upward) and overpredicts
21Since the eﬃcient algorithm generating multistep forecasts in the competing risks framework is currently
unavailable, and would require, in particular, the dynamic multistep forecasts of the covariate structure or
the factor structure, we come up with a shortcut solution that ignores the dynamic properties of covariates
but keeps intact the general structure of the model. The development of a truely dynamic forecasting model
is left for future investigation.
22The reliability plots of one-minute-ahead probability forecasts (not reported here) have similar properties,
except for the more substantial biases of these plots for high and low forecast probabilities.
31high probability events (right tails on the reliability plots are bent downward), which may
also serve as an evidence of rapid reaction of market participants to extremely high or low
probability signals. As the quality of information contained in the PCA components quickly
deteriorates as the forecast horizon increases, continuous monitoring of the relevant market
information and updating the risk indices are crucial conditions for the success in this highly
competitive segment of foreign exchange market.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the uniﬁed
competing risks framework is proposed for the analysis of high-frequency heterogeneous
trading activity in ﬁnancial markets organized as limit order books. The model has an
attractive behavioral interpretation and can be applied to any irregularly spaced observations
with heterogeneous attributes which are frequently encountered in empirical ﬁnance and
economics. The asymptotic theory developed by Andersen et al. [3] for counting processes
can be adopted with minimal adjustments to conduct the inference for competing risks. The
competing risks model of this paper represents a semiparametric alternative to the fully
parametric model of limit order trading by Bisière and Kamionka [5]. Our model is more
general, since it does not impose unjustiﬁed restrictions on the form of the baseline hazard
rates, which can lead to potential biases in the estimated covariate eﬀects and incorrect
inferences. It also serves as a ﬂexible hazard-based alternative to the multinomial logit
model of a limit order market (Ellul et al. [13]).
The model is applied to analyze the timing and interaction between quotes and trades
in the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system. Despite its rapid development in the
1990s, this segment of the foreign exchange market has been rarely studied before. The major
stylized facts about the dynamics of foreign exchange trading that have been reaﬃrmed by
the empirical application of the semiparametric competing risks model of this paper include
the clustering of market activity on the directional characteristics of last trade (“buyer or
seller pressure”) and the considerable sensitivity of the order submission strategies employed
by traders to the state of the limit order book and the quoting and trading history.
The model developed in this paper can be applied to a variety of high- and low-frequency
ﬁnancial data. One natural application of the competing risks technique involves the em-
pirical analysis of thinly or irregularly traded ﬁnancial instruments, corporate bonds, and
emerging market securities. In combination with conventional asset pricing models, the
methodology of the paper may be extended to the analysis of ﬁnancial instruments (such as
mortgage-backed securities and credit derivatives) that might be simultaneously aﬀected by
complex combinations of qualitative risks.
32Appendix
A. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Competing Risks
Consider N independent random vectors of latent durations (Tn1,...,T nR), n =1 ,...,N,
and the associated hazard functions h1(t|z),...,h R(t|z). The random variables Tn1,...,T nR
are assumed to be conditionally independent given the current covariates zn. Consider N
realizations of multivariate single-jump counting processes
Nn(t)=( Nn1(t),...,N nR(t)),n =1 ,...,N,
with
Nnr(t)=1{Tnr =m i n
r0 Tnr0 and Tnr ≤ t}.
Every individual counting process Nnr satisﬁes the multiplicative intensity model
λnr(t|z)=Ynrhr(t|z),r =1 ,...,R; n =1 ,...,N,
where Ynr is an observable indicator that contains information whether or not the market in
period n is at risk of experiencing an event of type r.
The pdf of duration T conditional on the next event being of type r and the current





















where h(t|z) and p(t|z) are the conditional hazard function and pdf of duration t,w h a t e v e r





where πr(t|z) is the probability that an event of type r occurs exactly t units of time since
the last event was observed, conditional on covariates z and given the information that some
33event happens at time t at all. Thus, the probability density function of duration between the




















The hazard rates of these risks are modelled using the Cox proportional hazard (CPH)
speciﬁcation
hr(t|z)=h0r(t)exp(z
0βr),r =1 ,...,R, (2)
where h0r(t)=hr(t|0) is the baseline hazard function, t i st h et i m ea tr i s k ,a n dz is the
covariate vector. Covariates in proportional hazard models always act multiplicatively on
the hazard rate of the speciﬁed type of event. The model (2) can be rewritten in the










where Hr(t|z) is the cumulative hazard function of risk r. The third equivalent representation
of the model (2) is based on the expression for the survival function
Sr(t|z)=e x p ( −Hr(t|z)) = exp(−H0r(t)exp(z
0βr)) = (S0r(t))
exp(z0βr),
where S0r(t)=Sr(t|0)=e x p ( −H0r(t)) is the baseline survivor function of risk r.To validate
the Singh—Maddala parametric form of duration dependence for the baseline hazard func-
tions (Bisière and Kamionka [5]), this dependence can be estimated nonparametrically. The
notional hazard rate of type r as a function of time since inception (i.e., the time measured
since the last publicly observed event) is assumed to be of the CPH form
hr(t|z;θr)=h0r(t)exp(z
0βr)
with the unknown parameter θr =( β
0
r,h 0r(·))0, and the dependence of notional hazards on
time being determined by functions h0r(·) which are permitted to vary arbitrarily over the
R types of risk.



























tn is the duration measured from the last observable event sn associated with the present





1 if the nth event is of type r,
0 otherwise.
The maximum likelihood estimates of parameters θ =( θ1,...,θR) are obtained by indepen-
dent maximization of functions Lr(θr) with respect to θr.
Let t(1)r <. . .<t (Nr)r denote the Nr distinct ordered durations of type r (r =1 ,...,R),



















depends on a ﬁnite dimensional parameter β,a n dt h er i s ks e tR(t(j)r) is deﬁned as the set
of observed durations that are equal to or larger than t(j)r. Insertion of maximum partial
likelihood estimators b β1,...,b βR into the expressions for hazard functions yields the Breslow
estimators of cumulative hazard functions














35where mjr is the number of tied durations of type r at t(j)r. The estimates of survivor
functions Sr(t|z; b βr) are obtained exactly as shown above for the case of a single risk.
Finally, the conditional probability that event of type r will be next to occur less than






0βr)dH0r(u),r =1 ,...,R, (4)






0b βr)d b H0r(u, b βr), (5)
where P0(0,t;Z0) and b P0(0,t;Z0) are respectively the conditional probability of survival at
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B. Forecasting the Probability of Next Event
Our probability forecasts will be based on the expressions (4) and (5) with the version






h0r(u)du = ∞, for some r =1 ,2,...,R, (6)
which guarantees that the probability of no event in interval [0;τ] converges to zero as the
period without arrivals of new observations expands. Then t0 seconds after the arrival of a
36new observable event the updated risk index Ynr = z0
nβr for the risk of type r feeds into the
expression of the hazard rate to yield
Hr(t;ynr)=H0r(t)exp(ynr)
and into expression (4) for the incidence rate to obtain the conditional probability that event
of type r will be next to occur less than t seconds after the previous observable event provided























is the conditional probability that no event occurs over the period [t0;t) after the previous
observable event given that no event has occurred over the period [0;t0) following the previous





b P0(t0,u; b yn·)exp(b ynr)d b H0r(u, b ynr),r =1 ,...,R, (8)
where





( b H0r(t, b ynr) − b H0r(t0,b ynr))exp(b ynr)
#
,
23A more parsimonious alternative characterization of the risk indices could be obtained in terms of the
PCA factors un =( u1,u 2,...,u Q)0 (section 6), since
Ynr = u0
nγr + e vnr = e Ynr + e vnr,r =1 ,...,R.
In this case the set of baseline cumulative hazard functions H0r(u) need to be recalculated to incorporate
the portion e vnr of the covariate index Ynr = e Ynr + e vnr assigned to the noise component. The conditional
probability formulas look similar, except that the indices e Ynr and baseline hazard functions e H0r(u) are
captured by the more parsimonious factor structure.
37b H0r(·,b ynr) can be, for example, the Breslow estimator (3), and b yn· =( b ynr)R
r=1 is the estimated
vector of risk indices. In particular, if only the subset of observable types of events r =1 ,...,S
(S<R ) and the epochs terminated less than τ seconds (0 <τ≤∞ )a f t e rt h el a s to b s e r v a b l e
event are considered in the analysis, then the probability evaluated t0 <τseconds after the
last event that the given epoch will be terminated with an event of an observable type






Finally, after substitution of the expression for the incidence rates Ps(t0,u;yn·) into the






































is the cumulative hazard function for the termination risk (triggered by an arrival of any
observable event s =1 ,...,S), and e h0r(·)=h0r(H−1(·,y n·)) is the baseline hazard rate of risk
r for all r =1 ,...,S, expressed in the units of “intrinsic time” H(·,y n·). Provided that the





then the odds ratio (9) takes the form of conventional logistic function (adjusted for the
passage of time) and forecasts can be based on the conventional multinomial logit estimates.
On the other hand, if the main interest is to obtain the forecasts of instantaneous relative
38risks exactly t0 seconds after the last observable event, one should directly substitute the













s=1 b Ps(t0,τ;b yn·)
(12)
for the expression (10) and formula (9).
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42Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Classiﬁcation of arrival and cancellation events on the sell side of limit order book
Risk (r) Limit order price P ∗ Price change Quantity change
A1∗∗ P∗ <P bid Pbid & Pask & Qbid ↓↑ Qask ↓↑
A2∗∗ Market sell order Pbid & Pask same Qbid ↓ if ∆Pbid =0
A3∗∗ P∗ = Pbid Pbid & Pask & Qbid ↓↑ Qask ↓↑
A4∗ P∗ − Pask < −1 Pask ↓ Qask → Q∗(lim.order size)
A5∗ P∗ − Pask =1 Pask ↓ Qask → Q∗(lim.order size)
A6∗ P∗ − Pask =0 No price eﬀect Qask ↑
A7 P∗ − Pask =1 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
A8, A9, A10, and A11 deﬁned similarly
A12 5 <P ∗ − Pask ≤ 10 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
A13 10 <P ∗ − Pask ≤ 20 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
A14 P∗ − Pask > 20 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
AC6∗ P∗ − Pask =0 Pask ↑ Qask ↓ if ∆Pask =0
AC7 P∗ − Pask =1 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
AC8, AC9, AC10, and AC11 deﬁned similarly
AC12 5 <P ∗ − Pask ≤ 10 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
AC13 10 <P ∗ − Pask ≤ 20 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
AC14 P∗ − Pask > 20 No price eﬀect No quantity eﬀect
43Table 2: Covariates characterizing the state of limit order book and recent trading history
Covariate Description
Slippage Current midquote minus last transaction price
Lt.Return Last minus 2nd-to-last transaction price
Spread>0 Best ask minus best bid quote, or zero, whatever is larger
Spread2
>0 (Best ask minus best bid quote)2, or zero, whatever is larger
∆Pask Change of ask quote between last and 2nd-to-last events
∆Pask,-1 Change of ask quote between 2nd- and 3rd-to-last events
∆Pbid Change of bid quote between last and 2nd-to-last events
∆Pbid,-1 Change of bid quote between 2nd- and 3rd-to-last events
log(Qask) Log depth at best ask quote, or log $10M, whatever is less
Q
+
ask 1 if log depth at ask equals $10M, zero otherwise
∆log(Qask) Change of log(Qask)i f∆Pask=0, zero otherwise
∆log(Qask,-1) Change of log(Qask,-1)i f∆Pask=0&∆Pask,-1=0, zero otherwise
log(Qbid) Log depth at best bid quote, or log $10M, whatever is less
Q
+
bid 1 if log depth at bid equals $10M, zero otherwise
∆log(Qbid) Change of log(Qbid)i f∆Pbid=0, zero otherwise
∆log(Qbid,-1) Change of log(Qbid,-1)i f∆Pbid=0&∆Pbid,-1=0, zero otherwise
Side 1 if last trade seller-initiated, -1 if buyer-initiated
Side-1 1 if 2nd-to-last trade seller-initiated, -1 if buyer-initiated
F0-5” Signed number of trades 0 to 5 sec. prior to last event
F5-10”,F 10-15”,F 15-30”,F 30-60”,F 1-2’,F 2-5’,F 5-15’ deﬁned similarly
T0-5” Number of trades 0 to 5 sec. prior to last event



























Example of supply and demand curves from Reuters D2000-2 dealing system
Figure 1 displays the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book at a particular moment
in time. The ersatz supply and demand curves on the market for US dollars are represented by limit sell
and buy orders waiting their execution. Two limit orders, for one and two million dollars, are available at
the best market sell price of DEM 1.7512 per dollar. Additionally, there is one limit order for three millions
at the ask price of DEM 1.7513, one limit order for one million at the ask price of DEM 1.7514, and two
limit orders for one million each at the ask price of DEM 1.7515 per US dollar. On the bid side, there is
one limit order to purchase two millions at the best market buy price of DEM 1.7509 per dollar, which is
followed (in the order of priority) by three limit orders for two million, one million, and two million dollars
at the bid price of DEM 1.7507, a limit order for two million at the bid price of DEM 1.7506, a limit order
for one million at the bid of DEM 1.7505, and another large limit order at the same price (the size of this
buy limit order is unclear from the graph). Note that traders observe only the best market buy and sell
prices DEM 1.7509 and DEM 1.7512, along with the quantities $2 mln. and $3 mln., respectively, on their
trading screens.




















Sell <P bid 0.103 −0.754 0.437 0.172 −0.006 −0.479 −0.436 −0.381
Market sell 0.067 −0.525 0.135 −0.069 0.174 0.361 0.068 −1.161
Sell = Pbid 0.081 −0.670 0.222 0.091 0.140 0.041 0.005 −1.146
Sell <P ask−1 0.062 0.451 0.089 −0.059 0.120 −0.013 0.053 −0.255
Sell at Pask−1 0.017 0.029 0.048 −0.101 0.302 −0.235 0.005 −0.253
Sell at Pask −0.105 0.017 −0.051 −0.124 0.122 0.798 0.017 −0.100
Sell at Pask+1 −0.176 −0.187 −0.130 −0.159 −0.101 0.060 0.058 0.025
Sell at Pask+2 −0.126 −0.162 −0.142 −0.136 −0.080 0.081 0.125 0.003
Sell at Pask+3 −0.138 −0.037 −0.120 −0.113 −0.026 0.037 0.080 −0.005
Sell at Pask+4 −0.139 −0.153 −0.115 −0.012 −0.043 0.067 0.042 −0.009
Sell at Pask+5 −0.208 −0.091 0.007 0.042 0.103 0.004 −0.045 0.051
Sell ≤ Pask+10 −0.135 −0.101 −0.080 −0.048 −0.081 0.013 0.025 −0.000
Sell ≤ Pask+20 −0.027 0.011 −0.098 −0.043 0.042 −0.028 0.009 −0.003
Cancel at Pask −0.149 −0.013 −0.014 −0.052 0.600 0.205 0.017 −0.228
Canc.at Pask+1 −0.257 −0.128 0.039 −0.096 −0.046 −0.040 0.014 0.101
Canc.at Pask+2 −0.299 −0.112 −0.102 0.050 0.029 −0.072 0.020 0.092
Canc.at Pask+3 −0.158 −0.116 −0.078 −0.152 0.007 −0.058 −0.030 0.152
Canc.at Pask+4 −0.212 −0.152 −0.153 0.021 −0.067 −0.015 0.015 0.127
Canc.at Pask+5 −0.167 −0.159 −0.037 0.013 0.191 −0.170 0.029 0.145
Canc.≤ Pask+10 −0.153 −0.016 −0.009 0.005 0.009 −0.047 0.048 0.091
Canc.≤ Pask+20 −0.036 −0.088 −0.037 −0.070 −0.050 −0.007 −0.028 0.121




















Sell <P bid 0.311 0.288 −0.017 0.018 −0.028 −0.003 0.008 0.002
Market sell 0.319 0.170 0.044 0.013 −0.003 −0.004 0.002 −0.001
Sell = Pbid 0.238 0.104 0.029 −0.001 −0.024 −0.006 0.003 0.000
Sell <P ask−1 0.216 0.075 0.018 −0.008 0.004 0.005 0.004 −0.000
Sell at Pask−1 0.105 0.047 0.028 −0.019 −0.014 −0.009 0.000 −0.001
Sell at Pask 0.022 −0.017 0.034 −0.013 −0.017 −0.008 −0.005 −0.004
Sell at Pask+1 −0.021 −0.018 0.021 −0.022 −0.014 −0.010 −0.005 −0.006
Sell at Pask+2 0.024 −0.017 −0.001 −0.022 −0.023 −0.008 −0.008 −0.002
Sell at Pask+3 −0.057 −0.027 0.011 −0.034 −0.024 −0.009 −0.007 −0.005
Sell at Pask+4 −0.085 0.035 0.001 −0.028 −0.034 −0.017 −0.008 −0.005
Sell at Pask+5 0.011 −0.008 −0.001 −0.007 −0.030 −0.016 −0.006 −0.008
Sell ≤ Pask+10 −0.006 0.010 0.007 −0.025 −0.026 −0.013 −0.008 −0.005
Sell ≤ Pask+20 −0.066 −0.049 0.001 −0.033 −0.025 −0.021 −0.009 −0.010
Cancel at Pask 0.042 0.085 0.014 0.022 0.007 −0.007 −0.002 −0.003
Canc.at Pask+1 0.112 0.083 0.030 0.032 −0.009 −0.012 −0.003 −0.003
Canc.at Pask+2 0.095 0.167 0.025 0.040 −0.005 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004
Canc.at Pask+3 0.054 0.175 0.025 0.043 0.015 −0.002 −0.002 −0.007
Canc.at Pask+4 0.138 0.097 0.039 0.042 0.015 −0.003 −0.005 −0.008
Canc.at Pask+5 0.138 0.144 0.026 0.018 0.028 −0.008 0.001 −0.003
Canc.≤ Pask+10 0.150 0.159 0.023 0.036 0.020 0.010 0.005 −0.001
Canc.≤ Pask+20 0.076 0.041 0.020 0.005 0.028 0.013 0.013 0.007




















Sell <P bid 0.069 0.009 0.037 0.004 0.004 0.006 −0.001 0.001
Market sell 0.019 0.008 0.018 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001
Sell = Pbid 0.043 0.025 0.014 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001
Sell <P ask−1 0.037 0.011 0.008 −0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
Sell at Pask−1 0.014 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001
Sell at Pask 0.019 0.027 0.022 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001
Sell at Pask+1 0.020 0.034 0.016 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001
Sell at Pask+2 0.041 0.028 0.029 0.017 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.001
Sell at Pask+3 0.024 0.034 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.005 0.001 0.001
Sell at Pask+4 0.021 0.041 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.002
Sell at Pask+5 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001
Sell ≤ Pask+10 −0.002 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.001
Sell ≤ Pask+20 0.004 0.017 0.028 0.015 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.000
Cancel at Pask 0.044 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.002 −0.000 0.000 0.001
Canc.at Pask+1 0.027 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001
Canc.at Pask+2 0.036 0.011 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001
Canc.at Pask+3 0.035 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.005 −0.001 0.003 0.001
Canc.at Pask+4 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001
Canc.at Pask+5 0.041 0.042 0.020 0.012 0.008 −0.001 0.003 0.000
Canc.≤ Pask+10 0.031 0.018 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002
Canc.≤ Pask+20 0.029 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.002 −0.004 0.002 0.002




















Buy >P ask −0.269 −0.687 −0.224 −0.212 0.107 −0.518 −0.543 −0.503
Market buy −0.132 −0.568 −0.133 0.087 0.194 0.552 0.053 −1.102
Buy = Pask −0.221 −0.760 −0.168 −0.050 0.199 −0.132 −0.032 −1.136
Buy >P bid+1 −0.110 0.468 −0.102 0.037 0.175 −0.359 −0.002 −0.328
Buy at Pbid+1 −0.023 0.071 −0.097 0.110 0.234 −0.265 −0.003 −0.090
Buy at Pbid 0.047 0.061 0.066 0.080 0.113 0.709 0.030 −0.179
Buy at Pbid−1 0.066 −0.177 0.178 0.168 −0.092 0.062 0.069 0.017
Buy at Pbid−2 0.053 −0.161 0.211 0.135 −0.040 0.052 0.005 0.045
Buy at Pbid−3 0.053 −0.126 0.179 0.035 −0.054 0.071 −0.012 0.045
Buy at Pbid−4 0.058 −0.119 0.119 0.116 −0.094 0.068 0.085 0.013
Buy at Pbid−5 0.020 0.079 0.158 0.002 0.096 −0.043 0.002 0.028
Buy ≥ Pbid−10 0.055 0.002 0.079 0.144 0.042 −0.009 −0.036 0.038
Buy ≥ Pbid−20 0.043 −0.002 0.018 0.055 0.014 −0.036 0.021 0.008
Cancel at Pbid 0.077 −0.019 −0.023 0.035 0.600 0.111 0.003 −0.199
Canc.at Pbid−1 0.179 −0.106 −0.018 0.059 −0.043 −0.026 0.009 0.092
Canc.at Pbid−2 0.286 −0.134 0.066 0.029 −0.031 −0.072 −0.011 0.128
Canc.at Pbid−3 0.156 −0.088 0.118 0.047 −0.054 −0.085 −0.002 0.143
Canc.at Pbid−4 0.175 −0.057 0.140 0.014 0.042 −0.098 −0.131 0.182
Canc.at Pbid−5 0.110 0.219 0.139 −0.039 0.097 −0.132 −0.100 0.182
Canc.≥ Pbid−10 0.045 −0.033 0.072 0.036 0.048 −0.108 0.013 0.143
Canc.≥ Pbid−20 0.022 0.021 0.017 0.079 −0.060 −0.023 0.030 0.067




















Buy >P ask −0.042 −0.167 −0.041 −0.016 0.000 −0.010 −0.005 −0.003
Market buy −0.246 −0.125 −0.053 −0.020 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.001
Buy = Pask −0.158 −0.103 −0.031 −0.002 0.009 0.004 −0.004 −0.003
Buy >P bid+1 −0.157 0.040 −0.018 −0.001 0.011 −0.000 −0.007 −0.007
Buy at Pbid+1 −0.138 0.027 −0.028 0.010 0.021 0.007 −0.002 −0.001
Buy at Pbid 0.013 0.012 −0.025 0.012 0.021 0.009 −0.000 0.001
Buy at Pbid−1 0.056 0.030 −0.008 0.012 0.028 0.012 0.002 −0.001
Buy at Pbid−2 0.075 0.054 −0.004 0.018 0.020 0.003 0.003 0.000
Buy at Pbid−3 0.070 0.044 −0.007 0.017 0.024 0.003 0.002 0.001
Buy at Pbid−4 0.090 0.034 −0.006 0.015 0.019 0.007 0.004 −0.001
Buy at Pbid−5 0.041 0.096 0.002 0.026 0.009 0.001 0.006 −0.000
Buy ≥ Pbid−10 0.086 0.060 0.001 0.015 0.020 0.005 0.009 0.004
Buy ≥ Pbid−20 0.054 0.039 −0.020 0.011 0.017 0.013 0.003 0.006
Cancel at Pbid −0.070 −0.069 −0.015 −0.025 −0.002 0.004 −0.002 0.002
Canc.at Pbid−1 −0.119 −0.023 −0.031 −0.029 −0.005 0.017 0.002 −0.001
Canc.at Pbid−2 −0.045 −0.132 −0.028 −0.024 0.005 0.008 0.000 −0.001
Canc.at Pbid−3 −0.102 −0.090 −0.049 −0.016 −0.017 0.007 0.005 0.001
Canc.at Pbid−4 −0.164 −0.120 −0.013 −0.026 −0.014 −0.000 0.000 0.002
Canc.at Pbid−5 −0.027 −0.144 −0.046 −0.051 −0.003 −0.001 0.001 −0.001
Canc.≥ Pbid−10 −0.098 −0.080 −0.046 −0.037 −0.032 −0.009 0.001 0.002
Canc.≥ Pbid−20 −0.073 −0.105 −0.011 −0.030 −0.035 −0.012 −0.012 −0.004




















Buy >P ask 0.075 0.022 0.036 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.000
Market buy 0.030 0.008 0.018 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001
Buy = Pask 0.050 0.017 0.017 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.000
Buy >P bid+1 0.051 0.017 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001
Buy at Pbid+1 0.017 0.014 −0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001
Buy at Pbid 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001
Buy at Pbid−1 0.012 0.008 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001
Buy at Pbid−2 0.026 0.023 0.030 0.015 0.006 −0.000 0.001 0.001
Buy at Pbid−3 0.031 0.014 0.012 0.019 0.008 −0.001 0.001 0.001
Buy at Pbid−4 0.012 0.008 0.020 0.018 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.001
Buy at Pbid−5 0.028 0.013 0.037 0.024 0.011 −0.004 0.002 0.001
Buy ≥ Pbid−10 0.006 0.018 0.032 0.018 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001
Buy ≥ Pbid−20 0.014 −0.002 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.001
Cancel at Pbid 0.049 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.000
Canc.at Pbid−1 0.031 −0.006 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
Canc.at Pbid−2 0.051 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001
Canc.at Pbid−3 0.037 0.011 0.014 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001
Canc.at Pbid−4 0.038 0.027 −0.006 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.001
Canc.at Pbid−5 0.056 0.030 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.008 −0.001 0.001
Canc.≥ Pbid−10 0.031 0.021 0.025 0.006 0.011 0.005 −0.000 0.001
Canc.≥ Pbid−20 0.027 0.029 0.017 0.016 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.001
51Table 9: Representation of PCA factor indices in terms of observable characteristics of the
limit order book and recent trading history
Covariate Fact.1 Fact.2 Fact.3 Fact.4 Fact.5 Fact.6 Fact.7
Constant −1.186 −0.287 −0.363 −2.496 0.227 −0.639 0.477
Slippage −0.068 0.330 −0.230 −0.014 −0.280 0.042 −0.166
Spread>0 −0.185 0.095 0.080 0.779 −0.058 −0.169 −0.076
∆Pask 0.028 0.129 −0.229 0.036 −0.103 0.150 −0.130
∆Pbid 0.016 0.144 −0.221 −0.055 −0.152 −0.367 −0.101
log(Qask) 0.033 −0.131 −0.103 0.165 −0.367 0.712 0.124
∆log(Qask) −0.004 −0.026 −0.051 0.193 −0.765 −0.380 0.459
log(Qbid) 0.078 0.089 0.160 0.191 0.386 0.637 −0.318
∆log(Qbid) −0.058 0.042 0.012 −0.020 0.684 −0.753 −0.725
Side 0.034 −0.241 −0.223 0.025 −0.184 −0.086 −0.091
Side-1 0.037 −0.211 −0.140 0.072 0.013 −0.015 −0.118
F0−500 −0.002 −0.077 −0.001 0.011 −0.038 −0.002 0.000
F5−1000 −0.003 −0.048 −0.059 0.009 0.061 −0.013 0.002
F10−1500 −0.001 −0.007 −0.059 0.019 0.066 0.000 −0.041
F15−3000 −0.004 0.012 −0.031 0.003 0.027 0.003 −0.010
F30−6000 −0.002 0.002 −0.022 0.003 0.011 −0.001 0.016
F1−20 −0.003 0.004 −0.013 −0.000 0.010 0.001 0.013
T0−500 0.059 0.016 −0.003 0.024 0.020 0.073 0.017
T5−1000 0.038 −0.002 0.027 0.012 −0.022 −0.018 −0.011
T10−1500 0.034 0.002 −0.002 0.006 0.002 −0.028 0.034
T15−3000 0.027 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.004 −0.039 0.021
T30−6000 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.008 −0.004 −0.011 0.002
T1−20 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 −0.007 0.002 0.000
T2−50 0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.006
T5−150 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
52Table 10: Cox ﬁve-factor regressions for competing risks of sell order arrivals






















































































































































53Table 11: Cox ﬁve-factor regressions for competing risks of buy order arrivals






















































































































































54Table 12: Cox ﬁve-factor regressions for competing risks of limit order cancellations






























































































































































































55Table 13: Eigenvalues and cumulative contribution of principal components to the competing
risk indices
123456789 1 0
Eigenvalue 20.16 7.26 5.70 4.12 2.15 1.01 0.88 0.66 0.61 0.56
Cumulative 0.438 0.596 0.720 0.810 0.857 0.879 0.898 0.912 0.925 0.937
Table 14: Modiﬁed classiﬁcation of observable events in the forecasting model
Risk category (s) Description of event Risk types (r) included
AA Seller-initiated transaction Risks A1—A3 in Table ??
AP+ Ask price improvement Risks A4—A5 in Table ??
AD+ Ask depth improvement Risk A6 in Table ??
A− Ask touch cancellation Risk AC6 in Table ??
BB Buyer-initiated transaction Risks B1—B3 in Table ??
BP+ Bid price improvement Risks B4—B5 in Table ??
BD+ Bid depth improvement Risk B6 in Table ??




























Supply and demand curves after the price improvement occurs on demand side
Figure 2 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a new limit order to purchase one million dollars at the bid price DEM 1.7510 per
dollar. The arrival of new limit order leads to reduction of the market bid-ask spread, and shifts the prior
ersatz demand curve to the right. The improved market liquidity associated with such an event validates the
term “price improvement”. However, the quantity (depth) available at the improved bid price DEM 1.7510







































Supply and demand curves after the depth improvement occurs on demand side
Figure 3 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a new limit order to purchase one million dollars at the bid price DEM 1.7509 per
dollar. The arrival of new limit order does not change the market bid-ask spread, but it shifts the portion
of prior ersatz demand curve below the best bid price DEM 1.7509 per dollar to the right. The improved







































Supply and demand curves after arrival of subsidiary bid one tick below the touch
Figure 4 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a new limit order to purchase one million dollars at the bid price DEM 1.7508 per
dollar, which is lower than the best bid price DEM 1.7509 available on the market. The arrival of new limit
order does not change the public information on the Reuters D2000-2 trading screens, in particular, it does
not aﬀect the size of the bid-ask spread and the market depth at the touch (best bid quote). However, the


























1 New limit order
Figure 5:
Supply and demand curves after arrival of subsidiary bid two ticks below the touch
Figure 5 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a new limit order to purchase one million dollars at the bid price DEM 1.7507 per
dollar, which is two ticks below the best bid price DEM 1.7509 available on the market. The arrival of new
limit order does not change the public information on the Reuters D2000-2 trading screens, since the market




















































Supply and demand curves after subsidiary bid cancellation
Figure 6 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after cancellation of the subsidiary limit order to purchase two million dollars at the bid price DEM
1.7506 per dollar. The cancellation event does not aﬀect public information on the Reuters D2000-2 trading




















































Unmatched portion of new market order
cancelled automatically
Figure 7:
Supply and demand curves after arrival of large market buy order
Figure 7 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a market order to purchase ﬁve million dollars, which was submitted at the best
ask market price of DEM 1.7512 per dollar. Since the quantity available at this price is only three million
dollars, part of demand for liquidity created by the new market order arrival is not satisﬁed. The unmatched





















































Unmatched portion of new limit order
Figure 8:
Supply and demand curves after arrival of large aggressive limit bid
Figure 8 displays the change in the state of the Reuters D2000-2 electronic limit order book shown on
Figure 1 after arrival of a limit order to purchase ﬁve million dollars at the limit order price which coincides
with the best ask market price of DEM 1.7512 per dollar previously available on the market. The situation
is analogous to the submission of buy market order (Figure 7), except that the unmatched portion of the
arriving aggressive limit order remains on the limit order book, leading to the improvement of the best bid
price by three ticks to DEM 1.7512 per dollar. The best bid price moves one tick up to DEM 1.7513 per
dollar.
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A representative ten-minute sample of best market bid and ask quotes and transactions in
Reuters D2000-2 trading system
Figure 9 shows a small subsample of continuously sampled best market bid and ask quotes, as well as
the times and prices of buyer- and seller-initiated transactions (marked by small white crosses and knots,
respectively). All prices were obtained by matching limit and market orders from the original Reuters D2000-





































Eigenvalues of principal components for the covariate indices of competing risks
Figure 10 displays the plot of eigenvalues corresponding to the ﬁrst Q =1 3PCA factors of
the competing risk indices r =1 ,...,R.S i n c e o n l y ﬁve of these eigenvalues are unambiguously
above the horizontal line λ =1 , which suggests PCA factors 1 through 5 can be treated as
independent pervasive components driving the market dynamics. Even though factors 6 and 7 are













































Log-eigenvalue (LEV) diagram for principal components of the competing risk indices
Figure 11 displays the LEV diagram, which is obtained by replotting Figure ?? on the logarithmic
scale. The darker line plots the eigenvalues corresponding to the PCA factors of the competing risk indices
r =1 ,...,R . Deviations of plot from the linear pattern on the left for low eigenvalues suggests that retention
of Q =5PCA factors for further analysis would be appropriate. The choice of Q =5is conﬁrmed by the
comparison of the actual eigenvalues with the 95% conﬁdence bounds shown on the graph in pink color that
are obtained by a bootstrap procedure under the null hypothesis that all eigenvalues corresponding to the
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Figure 12:
Cross-correlograms of the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors (principal components)
Figure 12 displays the estimated oﬀ-diagonal terms of cross-correlograms of the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors
associated with the aggregate risks of limit order book events. Cell (i,j) of the chart contains the estimated
cross-correlogram of factors i and j deﬁned by the formula





where h is the lead (forward shift) of factor j relative to factor i measured by the number of epochs. All
calculations are performed for the values of h between −70 and 70 and based on the subsample covering the
liquid trading hours (6 a.m. to 5 p.m. GMT) on October 6—8, 1997.
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Autocorrelograms of the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA factors (principal components)
Figure 13 displays the estimated autocorrelation functions (autocorrelograms) for the ﬁrst ﬁve PCA
factors associated constructed from the risk indices of the aggregated limit order book activity. Autocorrelo-
grams of factor 1 (shown by the unmarked solid line) and factor 3 (highlighted by “x” symbols) demonstrate
slow rate of decline with the lag order, which is a clear evidence of long memory and potential nonstation-
arity. Autocorrelograms of factors 4 and 5 (highlighted by pluses and squares, respectively) also decline
relatively slowly which serves as an evidence of long memory. The autocorrelogram of factor 2 (highlighted
by circles) rapidly declines to zero with the lag order and becomes indistinguishable from zero at lag 50. All
calculations are performed using the subsample covering only the liquid trading hours 6 am to 5 pm GMT
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Figure 14:
Cross-correlograms of activity imbalance, buyer pressure, and bull market momentum
(PCA factors 2, 3 and 5)
Figure 14 highlights the portion of the estimated cross-correlogram 12 that displays the interaction of
the second, third, and ﬁfth PCA factors. These factors are identiﬁed in the text as the limit order book
activity imbalance (factor 2), the buyer pressure (factor 3), and the bull market momentum (factor 5). Cell
(i,j) of the chart contains the estimated cross-correlogram




of PCA factors i and j,w h e r eh is the lead (forward shift) of factor j relative to factor i measured as the
number of consecutive ticks. All calculations are performed for the values of h between −70 and 70 and
based on the subsample covering the liquid trading hours (6 a.m. to 5 p.m. GMT) on October 6—8, 1997.
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A representative ten-minute sample for one-step-ahead forecast probabilities of buy and sell
transactions
Figure 15 shows a small subsample of one-step forecast probabilities of buyer- and seller-initiated trans-
actions made after at least one second elapsed since the previous event, as well as the times of actual
buyer-initiated transactions (shown by crosses) and seller-initiated transactions (shown by knots). The fore-
casts are based on the version of PCA factor competing risks model with S =8types of observable risks
and the covariate structure comprised by Q =5PCA factors as described in section 6. The sample period
covers the episode 8:20 to 8:30 a.m. GMT on Monday, October 6, 1997, which is identical to the period
used to produce the graph of the best market bid and ask quotes and transactions (Figure 9). The forecast
probabilities of buyer-initiated trades are shown on the plot as the distance of lower solid line from the
horizontal zero-probability line. The forecast probabilities of seller-initiated trades are shown as the distance
of the upper solid line from the 100% probability horizontal line.
70Reliability Plots for Buy and Sell Forecasts
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Reliability plots for one-step-ahead forecast probabilities of buy and sell transactions
Figure 16 displays the reliability plots for one-step-ahead forecast probabilities of buyer- and seller-
initiated transactions made after at least one second elapsed since the previous event. The forecasts are
b a s e do nt h ev e r s i o no fP C Af a c t o rc o m p e t i n gr i s k sm o d e lw i t hS =8types of observable risks and the
covariate structure comprised by Q =5PCA factors as described in section 6. Two diagrams on the top
are based on the liquid trading hours of the ﬁrst three trading days (the model estimation period). The
left and right diagrams on the top plot, respectively, the fractions of epochs terminated with buy and sell
transactions against the forecast probabilities of such events. Two diagrams on the bottom are based on
the liquid trading hours of the last two days (the out-of-sample period). The left and right diagrams on
the bottom plot, respectively, the fractions of epochs terminated with buy and sell transactions against the
forecast probabilities of such events.
71In-Sample Reliability of Directional Forecasts
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In-sample reliability plots for probability forecasts of next trade in 30 seconds
Two diagrams on the left-hand side of Figure 17 show reliability plots for probability forecasts of the
event that the next transaction in the limit order book will be initiated by a buyer and will occur in 30
seconds since the time of forecast. Two diagrams on the right-hand side of Figure 17 show reliability plots
for probability forecasts of the event that the next transaction in the limit order book will be initiated by
a seller and will occur in 30 seconds since the time of forecast. The forecasts evaluated on the top section
of the graph are produced by the trinomial logit regression with the covariates given by the ﬁve competing
risks PCA factors. The forecasts evaluated on the lower section of the graph are produced by the benchmark
forecasting model based on the trinomial logit regression with the covariates given by the signs of last 10
transactions (±1 if the transaction was initiated by seller/buyer). All diagrams are based on the data from
the estimation period 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. GMT on October 6—8, 1997.
72Out-of-Sample Reliability of Directional Forecasts
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Out-of-sample reliability plots for probability forecasts of next trade in 30 seconds
Two diagrams on the left-hand side of Figure 18 show reliability plots for probability forecasts of the
event that the next transaction in the limit order book will be initiated by a buyer and will occur in 30
seconds since the time of forecast. Two diagrams on the right-hand side of Figure 18 show reliability plots
for probability forecasts of the event that the next transaction in the limit order book will be initiated by
a seller and will occur in 30 seconds since the time of forecast. The forecasts evaluated on the top section
of the graph are produced by the trinomial logit regression with the covariates given by the ﬁve competing
risks PCA factors. The forecasts evaluated in the lower section of the graph are produced by the benchmark
forecasting model based on the trinomial logit regression with the covariates given by the signs of last 10
transactions (±1 if the transaction was initiated by seller/buyer). All diagrams are based on the data from
the out-of-sample period covering the trading hours 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. GMT on October 9—10, 1997.
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